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The number of investment treaties has surged in the past decade.1
Even now, the United States2 and Canada3 are actively engaged in
programs designed to facilitate the completion of multilateral treaties
such as the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA-DR) 4 and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs).
These investment treaties act like economic bills of rights, which grant
foreign investors substantive protections and procedural rights to
facilitate investment. 5 Sovereigns, meanwhile, may benefit from these
treaties by obtaining increased foreign direct investment, which may
1 See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Arbitration: Privatizing
Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521,
1522-23 (2005) [hereinafter Franck, Inconsistent Decisions] (noting that countries have
entered into over five multi-lateral treaties and over 1500 of the approximately 2100
BITs in the last twelve years); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
Investment Instruments Online: About, http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/
Page 644.aspx [hereinafter UNCTAD] (stating that the "number of BITs has
increased dramatically ...to a total of 2,181 by 2002"); UNCTAD, Press Release:
Bilateral Investment Treaties Quintupled During the 1990s, Dec. 15, 2000,
TAD/INF/PR/077, http://www.unctad.orgfTemplates/webflyer.asp?docid=2655&intltem
ID=2023&lang=l.
2 U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program,
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/22422.htm (last visited January 8, 2006); U.S.
Department of State, Press Release September 28, 2004: United States, Pakistan Begin
Bilateral Investment Treaty negotiations, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/prsrl
/2004/36573.htm; see also United States Trade Representative, Trade Agreements,
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/SectionIndex.html (last visited January 8,
2006) (describing the various free trade agreements being negotiated).
3 See International Trade Canada, Regional and Bilateral Initiatives: Canada's
Foreign Investment Protection Agreements (FIPAs), at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-
nac/fipa-en.asp (last visited January 8, 2006) (describing Canada's investment treaty
negotiations with India, China and Peru).
4 During this past summer, CAFTA-DR was the subject of a variety of debates
before the U.S. Congress but was finally passed by Congress and signed into law on
August 2, 2005. Adam Entous, Bush Signs Central American Pact after Tough Fight,
Aug. 2, 2005, http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20050802/plnm/trade cafta usa dc.
CAFTA-DR involves the United States, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. United States Trade Representative,
CA FTA Briefing Book, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/
CAFTA/BriefingBook/Section Index.html; see also United States Trade
Representative, CAFTA-DR Final Text, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements
/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DRFinalTexts/SectionIndex.html (providing the
finalized text of CAFTA-DR) [hereinafter Multilateral Investment Treaties such as
CAFTA-DR and NAFTA are often referred to as MITs.] The North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is another example of a multilateral treaty. North
American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 612
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1994), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/
trade/nafta/naftatce.asp [hereinafter NAFTA].
- See infra notes 22-28; Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1529-33.
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promote the development of their country's infrastructure 6 and offer
citizens basic services including access to clean water, electricity and
roads.
With the expansion of investor rights and remedies, the number of
disputes has increased. Ninety-two claims have been filed by investors
in the past three years, representing half of the aggregate historical
claims filed under investment treaties.7  These disputes have a
significant financial impact. Claims pending against Argentina involve
"billions and billions" of dollars,8 and a recent $500 million claim
brought by Texas farmers under NAFTA's Chapter 11 relates to
Mexico's alleged failure to protect their water rights.9
As the disputes have evolved and been resolved, there has been
remarkable consistency in some areas, such as jurisdictional
determinations,1" but marked inconsistency in others. 1  This
inconsistency has given rise to questions about the legitimacy and
reliability of the investment treaty dispute resolution process.' 2  The
6 See infra note 16 (noting the debate in the literature as to whether BITs achieve
their stated goal of fostering foreign direct investment).
I Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1521-22; The UNCTAD
Secretariat, Issues Related to International Arrangements: Investor-State Disputes and
Policy Implications, TD/B/COM.2/62 (Jan. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.unctad.org/ en/docs/c2d62_en.pdf [hereinafter Policy Implications].
I See Michael D. Goldhaber, Big Arbitrations, AM. LAWYER (Summer 2003),
http://www.americanlawyer.com/focuseurope/bigarbitrations.html; see also Charles H.
Brower II, Counsel Comment: Reform Priorities at International Trade and Investment
Institutions, 21 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 6 (Aug./Oct. 2005) (indicating that "ICSID's docket
comprises some 90 cases involving $25 billion, as opposed to five cases involving $15
million ten years ago").
9 BNA, NAFTA Water Dispute Between Texas, Mexico Headed For Binding
Arbitration Austin, July 13, 2005, http://pubs.bna.comlip/BNA/ied.nsf/is/AOBlC6B9H0;
Western Water News, Texas Farmers File Formal Notice of NAFTA Violation - Seek
Damages from Mexico for Failure to Deliver Treaty Water, October 2004,
http://www.argentco.com/htm/f20041001.535005.htm.
10 There has been remarkable consistency in areas related to jurisdiction, for
example, where multiple tribunals organized under different treaties in cases involving
different parties and different facts have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g.,
Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v. Ecuador, Final Award, LCIA Case No.
UN 3467, T1 51, July 1, 2004, available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/oxy-
ecuadorfinalaward_001.pdf [hereinafter Occidental Award] (noting Lauder, Genin,
Auguas del Aconquija, CMS, Azurix, and Vivdendi have reached similar conclusions
about distinguishing between claims based upon treaty, contract or domestic
legislation).
1 Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1558-82.
12 Ari Afilalo, Meaning, Ambiguity and Legitimacy: Judicial (Re-) Construction of
NAFTA Chapter 11, 25 NW. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 279 (2005); Charles H. Brower II,
Structure Legitimacy and NAFTA 's Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37
(2000) [hereinafter Brower, Structure]; Charles N. Brower, A Crisis of Legitimacy, 26
2005]
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investment treaty dispute resolution system is in its infancy; and,
arguably it is experiencing classic growing pains while it functions to
the satisfaction of some and the dissatisfaction of others. In
Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that, the "entire
man is, so to speak, to be seen in the cradle of the child. ' 13 Likewise,
the future of investment treaties can be envisioned as we watch the
dispute resolution process take its first baby steps. While there may be
times during which this dispute resolution process will falter, trips and
falls provide vital information about how to avoid pitfalls and learn to
walk with a confident stride through the world of global investment.
The symposium for which this paper was written discussed the
evolution of investment treaties, whether they achieved their desired
goals, and the mechanics of enforcing investment rights. This panel
asked a fundamental but speculative question: what does the future
hold for investment treaties?
The future of investment treaties is intertwined with the future of
investment treaty arbitration. Whether Sovereigns 14 follow the active
approach of the United States in promulgating investment treaties or
the abstention approach of Ireland 15 will depend in part upon the
perceived benefits of the treaties - namely, whether foreign investors
are perceived to have too many or two few rights in light of the other
costs and benefits of entering into investment treaties.16  But this
NAT'L L.J. B9 (Oct. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Brower, Crisis]; Charles N. Brower, NAFTA's
Investment Chapter: Dynamic Laboratory, Failed Experiments, and Lessons for the
FTAA, 97 AM SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 251 (2003) [hereinafter Brower, FTAA]; Franck,
Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1; Carlos G. Garcia, All the Other Dirty Little Secrets:
Investment Treaties, Latin America, and the Necessary Evil of Investor-State Arbitration,
16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 301 (2004); but see Judith A.E. Gill, Inconsistent Decisions: An Issue
to be Addressed or a Fact of Life?, 2 TRANSNAT'L DIsP. MGMT. (Apr. 2005) (on file
with author) (describing the difficulties caused by inconsistent arbitration awards but
suggesting there are inconsistencies in court decisions and inconsistencies will be
addressed over time).
13 ALEXIs DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 29 (Joseph Epstein ed.,
Bantam Classic Book 2000) (1835).
14 For the purposes of this article, "Sovereigns" are sovereign national
governments, which consent to be a party to an investment agreement.
15 Ireland does not have an active investment treaty program. It is only a signatory
to one BIT and one MIT. See Agreement Between the Czech Republic and Ireland for
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, June 28, 1996,
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/czech-ireland.pdf [hereinafter
Ireland/Czech Republic BIT]; Department of Foreign Affairs, Irish Treaty Series:
Treaty Series 2001, http://foreignaffairs.gov.ie/treaties/irish-treaty-series-database.asp?
yy=2001&dd=2000 (describing Ireland's entry into the Energy Charter Treaty); see also
E-mail from Klaus Reichert, Irish Barrister, to Susan Franck, Assistant Professor of
Law, University of Nebraska College of Law (July 28,2005) (on file with author).
16 The purported benefits of entering into treaties are the creation of enhanced
[Vol. 12:47
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question raises two distinct issues. First, are Sovereigns content with
the procedural rights they grant to investors in BITs? Second, are
Sovereigns content with the substantive legal rights they have ceded in
investment treaties? At present, these two distinct questions are being
conflated. The procedural framework for resolving investment treaty
disputes has fostered a certain ambiguity about the meaning and scope
of substantive guarantees. 17  Until the mechanism for resolving
investment treaty disputes is improved to offer a process that renders a
clearer, more predictable and consistent doctrine about the scope and
application of investment rights, Sovereigns will be inhibited from
making an informed evaluation of the utility of entering into
investment treaties.18 Should Sovereigns be unable to make such an
foreign direct investment and incentives to develop the internal market. The costs of
entering into treaties come from an abrogation of sovereignty, and the possibility of
fiscal remuneration to investors for conduct deemed to violate the treaty. Other factors
may also affect the future of investment treaties, including whether the other purported
benefit of BITs - namely the procurement of foreign investment - is realized.
Scholars remain split on the issue of whether BITs actually promote foreign investment.
Some scholars suggest that countries enter into investment treaties as a result of
economic pressures and a desire to prevent neighboring countries from obtaining a
competitive advantage in the international marketplace, whereas other scholars
disagree. See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them:
Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA J. INT'L L. 639 (1998);
Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI? Only a Bit...
and They Could Bite, (The World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3121,
2003), available at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/29143wps3l21.pdf (suggesting BITs
only marginally impact decisions to invest abroad); but see Jeswald W. Salacuse &
Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITS Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment
Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 67, 111-12 (2005) [hereinafter
Salacuse & Sullivan] (suggesting that the development of international investment rules
in BITs has had the effect of encouraging new capital flows). Other scholars, including
Andrew T. Guzman, Jennifer Tobin, Deborah L. Swenson, and Jason W. Yackee,
addressed these issues in the symposium entitled "Romancing the Foreign Investor:
BIT by BIT" held at the University of California at Davis, March 4, 2005.
17 Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1558-82 (describing various sets
of inconsistent decisions which have created ambiguity about the meaning of
substantive rights in bilateral and multilateral investment treaties); but see Jack J. Coe,
Jr., Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in Its Tenth Year: An Interim Sketch of Selected,
Themes, Issues and Methods, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1381 (2003) (suggesting a
variety of trends that are visible after ten years of heavy litigation on the same
substantive rights provided in NAFTA).
18 See Susan D. Franck, International Decision: Occidental Exploration &
Production Co. v. Republic of Ecuador. Final Award. London Court of International
Arbitration Administered Case No. UN 3467. At <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/oxy-
ecuadorfinalaward OOl.pdf>. Arbitral tribunal, July 1, 2004, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 675, 680-
81 (2005) [hereinafter Franck, International Decision] (suggesting that where there is
enhanced certainty about the meaning of investment rights, Sovereigns can make more
informed decisions about which rights they provide investors).
2005]
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informed choice, there may be significant dissatisfaction after the fact
that may disrupt both investment and international relations. 9
Remarks in this paper first summarize certain basic concepts
related to investment treaty arbitration. Second, the remarks describe
the difficulties related to inconsistencies that arise in the context of
investment treaty arbitration and explain why these inconsistencies are
more challenging than those that exist in traditional arbitration. Third,
the remarks summarize a framework for considering how best to
address problems created by these inconsistencies in investment
arbitration. Viewed through the lens of how indirect, direct, and
hybrid measures can promote consistency and systemic efficiency, this
paper concludes that the approach of "safeguard builders" - those
who promote the use of structural safeguards in investment treaty
arbitration - most effectively and efficiently brings consistency, clarity
and predictability to the meaning of substantive treaty rights. By using
various safeguards to promote consistency in arbitral decision-making,
a Sovereign can assess on a more efficient, systematic and reliable basis
the sovereignty it cedes and the reciprocal rights it gains for its citizens
when negotiating an investment treaty.
I. INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION IN A NUTSHELL
A BIT is an agreement between two Sovereigns that safeguards
the investments made by investors from each country in businesses or
projects located in the other's territories.2" These treaties have a
common origin2 and function, where Sovereigns offer investors basic
guarantees in the hopes of procuring foreign investment within their
19 For example, dissatisfaction with awards has caused some countries to consider
withdrawing from their international obligations or resulted in public hearings as to
utility of foreign direct investment. See infra notes 54-55 (describing the situation in the
Czech Republic); Franck, International Decision, supra note 18, at 680-81 (describing
the situation in Ecuador).
20 MITs, like NAFTA and CAFTA-DR, function essentially in the same way as
BITs but provide investment protection on a multi-lateral basis. NAFTA Chapter 11,
supra note 4 and CAFTA-DR Chapter 10, supra note 4. They differ in other respects,
however, and may address issues beyond investment protection rights. For example,
they typically address issues such as rules of origin, customs obligations, sanitary, and
phyto-sanitary measures and cross-border trade in services. See NAFTA Chapters 4, 5,
7, 15 supra note 4 and CAFTA-DR Chapters 4, 5, 7, 11, supra note 4.
21 While each individual treaty has distinct permutations, the substantive rights in
BITs have originated and evolved from investment rights provided in treaties of
friendship, navigation and commerce and unsuccessful multilateral treaties. Franck,
Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1526-27, 1618; Daniel M. Price, Some
Observations on Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 421,
423 (2000).
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jurisdiction. 22 These rights consist of a variety of general guarantees to
substantive standards of protection for their investments, including
appropriate compensation for expropriation, freedom from
unreasonable or discriminatory measures, guarantees of national
treatment, assurances of fair and equitable treatment of investments,
promises that investments will receive full protection and security as
well as treatment no less favorable than that accorded under
international law, and a Sovereign's commitment to honor its
obligations. 23 These substantive guarantees create a new system of
international rights and obligations for the signatories. As a practical
matter, the substantive standards in BITs have become the
fundamental source of international law in the area of foreign
investment, displacing customary international law as well as, in some
cases, relevant domestic law.
2 4
BITs also provide procedural rights that permit the enforcement
of the substantive rights. Generally, two different types of parties can
bring claims related to an investment treaty. First, Sovereigns can
bring claims where a dispute arises about the interpretation or
application of the treaty. This typically requires Sovereigns to settle
disputes diplomatically and, as a last resort, through arbitration.
25
Sovereigns infrequently utilize this option,
26 perhaps in part because
22 See supra note 14; Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 16, at 75-79.
23 Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1529-1532; Salacuse & Sullivan,
supra note 16, at 83-85; Giorgio Sacerdoti, Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral
Instruments on Investment Protection 265-75, in RECUEIL DES COURs 299 (1997).
Investment treaties also tend to provide other rights such as matters related to
monetary transfers and operational conditions of investment. Salacuse & Sullivan,
supra note 16, at 79.
24 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 16, at 70, 112-13. The specific relationship
between BITs and customary international, in particular, is challenging. One might also
suggest that BITs complement customary international law and perhaps are a main
source of it. See generally Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of Bilateral Investment
Treaties in the Formulation of Customary International Law, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
327 (1994).
25 Treaties typically provide that Sovereigns should first try to resolve their disputes
through diplomatic means, but if a dispute cannot be settled, the matter will be decided
through arbitration. See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic
of Singapore, U.K.-Sing., art. 9, July 22, 1975, http://www.unctad.org/sections/
dite/iia/docsfbits/uk -singapor1978.pdf; Revised US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty,
art. 37, Feb. 5, 2004, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/29030.doc
[hereinafter Revised US Model BIT].
26 The author is aware only of two instances where the State-to-State dispute
resolution provisions have been utilized to seek clarification of the issues at issue in the
investor-State proceeding. See Bernardo M. Cremades, Has the Proliferation of BITs
Gone Too Far: Is it Now Time for a Multilateral Investment Treaty?, 5 J. WORLD
INVEST. & TRADE 89, 90-91 (2004) (describing the new development of requesting
2005]
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little difference exists between this option and the traditional method
of espousing investment-related claims before the International Court
of Justice.17  Second, investors can directly bring a claim against a
Sovereign for violation of a treaty, functioning in a manner similar to
private attorneys general in the protection of the public interest.28
Investors now regularly bring investment claims, in part because
this direct action lets investors choose where they will bring their
claims. 29 In what amounts to a sophisticated choice of forum clause,
some treaties require investors to choose between litigating their treaty
claims in national courts and arbitrating their investment claims before
an arbitral panel in a neutral forum, such as the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or an ad hoc tribunal organized under
the UNCITRAL rules.3 Other treaties require investors to arbitrate
their claims, but let the investors choose the arbitral body that will
administer the dispute.31
State-to-State arbitration to interpret a BIT); Giorgio Sacerdoti, Has the Proliferation
of BITs Gone Too Far: Is it Now Time for a Multilateral Investment Treaty?, 5 J.
WORLD INVEST. & TRADE 97, 99 (2004) (noting that the Czech Republic approached
The Netherlands for bilateral consultations related to disputed issues in the
Lauder/CME arbitrations and describing "a new form of parallel litigation-to ask for
State-to-State arbitration under a BIT in order to interpret the very clause of a treaty
which is at issue in arbitration"); but see Policy Implications, supra note 7, at 4 n.3
(suggesting that the only State-to-State claim has been filed between Chile and Peru
related to Luccehetti v. Peru).
27 Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1536-37.
28 Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a Global Age: Public
Interests in Private International Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 219 (2001);
Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1538; see also Tai-Heng Cheng, Power,
Authority and International Investment Law, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 465, 471 (2005)
(explaining how, even though investors have not participated in the negotiation of an
investment treaty, they may still enforce the treaty's protections).
29 Investors may wish to bring direct claims against Sovereigns for a variety of
reasons. First, investors no longer have to ask governments to espouse their claims and
let their dispute resolution form part of a larger international relations dialogue.
Second, investors receive any damages awarded for breach of the treaty, subject to any
taxes which their home jurisdictions may withdraw from their accounts. Third, the
enforcement mechanisms - particularly in the case of arbitration - are stronger. See
Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1536-38.
3o Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1541-42.
31 Agreement Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Republic of Poland for
the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Egypt-Pol., art. 8(2), July 1,
1995, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/egypt-poland.pdf
(only permitting arbitration before a variety of institutions); Agreement for the
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Gr. Brit.-Sing., art. 8, July 22, 1975, 1018
U.N.T.S. 175 (providing ICSID with exclusive jurisdiction over investment disputes),
available at http://www.unctad.org/sectionslditeliia/docs/bits/uk-singapor.pdf. Other
treaties, however, require the substance of the disputes to be decided before a national
[Vol. 12:47
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Investors have overwhelmingly accepted Sovereigns' standing
offers to arbitrate 32 and have brought their claims before arbitral
tribunals, which provide a neutral forum for resolving disputes against
a Sovereign and render awards with streamlined enforcement
mechanisms. 33 The investor begins the process by submitting the
requisite notice and request for arbitration. The investor and the
Sovereign each select one arbitrator. Typically, the party-appointed
arbitrators then together appoint a third arbitrator as a Chair. The
claim resolution procedures then commence in earnest. The parties
gather their evidence and make arguments in private; and the tribunal
renders an award that is enforceable worldwide.
34
II. THE IMPACT OF INCONSISTENCY
Investment treaty arbitration has a dirty little secret that is
becoming less secret every day.
35 Different tribunals come to different
court but the damages phase to be evaluated by an arbitral tribunal. Agreement
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, P.R.C.-
Ghana, art. 10, Oct. 12, 1989, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/
docs/bits/china-ghana.pdf (providing the following: the quantum phase of certain
investment disputes is subject to ad hoc arbitration; the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce [hereinafter SCC] is the default appointing authority; and, although no
specific procedural rules are established, the tribunal can use either the SCC or ICSID
rules "as guidance").
32 In Jan Paulsson's classic formulation analyzing the contractual nature of the
arbitration agreement for investment treaties, the dispute resolution provisions in
investment treaties constitute a unilateral offer for arbitration that the investor accepts
by initiating arbitration. Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV.-
F.I.L.J. 232 (1995); see also Coe, supra note 17, at 1393; Cremades & Cairns, infra note
86, at 184 (describing how the "right to initiate an investor-State arbitration is treaty
based; normally there is no contract between the parties and the right is unilateral in
that it can be exercised by the investor but not the State"); see generally Andrea K.
Bjorklund, Contract Without Privity: Sovereign Offer and Investor Acceptance, 2 CHI. 
J.
INT'L L. 183 (2001).
33 The author is unaware of any case where an investor has elected to bring its
investment treaty claims before a national court. While investors may bring their
domestic law claims before domestic courts, once investors are made aware that 
they
may have an international remedy before a neutral, international tribunal, investors
tend to elect to arbitrate their treaty claims.
34 Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1543-1545.
35 Michael D. Goldhaber, Wanted: A World Investment Court, AM. LAWYER
(Summer 2004) [hereinafter Goldhaber, Investment Court], available at
http://www.americanlawyer.com/focuseurope/investmentcourtO
4.html. Investment
treaty arbitration generally has been coming out of the proverbial closet in the last five
years. In a now famous formulation, a New York Times article described investment
treaty arbitration in the following manner: "Their meetings are secret. Their members
are generally unknown. The decisions they reach need not be fully disclosed. Yet the
way a group of international tribunals handles disputes between investors and foreign
2005]
University of California, Davis
results under nearly identical textual treaty rights. But why do these
different results matter?
The World Bank's International Center for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes,36 the body administering the majority of
investment treaty cases, as well as other groups37 have remarked on
several occasions on the need for consistency. Although arbitration
awards do not technically have de jure precedential value,38 some
commentators suggest these awards should have precedential weight
similar to that enjoyed by decisions of Mixed Claims Commissions or
arbitration awards rendered by the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal. 39 In any
governments can lead to national laws being revoked and environmental regulations
changed." Anthony DePalma, NAFTA's Powerful Little Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
2001, at Cl; see also Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch Advertisement, Fast Track
Attack on America's Values, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2001, at A5; Bill Moyers, Transcript:
Trading Democracy - A Bill Moyers Special, http://www.pbs.org/now/
transcript/transcript-tdfull.html.
36 See International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, Possible
Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration, IT 6, 21-23 (Oct. 22, 2004),
available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/improve-arb.pdf [hereinafter ICSID WhitePaper] (suggesting it may be "desirable to ensure coherence and consistency in case lawgenerated in ICSID and other investor-to-State arbitrations", describing the intent to
"foster coherence and consistency in case law" noting there "clearly is scope forinconsistencies in the case law," and suggesting that changes designed to foster
"[e]fficiency and economy, as well as coherence and consistency"); Antonio R. Parra,Provisions on the Settlement of Investment Disputes in Modern Investment Laws,
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment, 12 ICSID REV.- F.I.L.J. 287, 352 (1997) (remarking that the "scope for inconsistent decisions in
regard to essentially the same issues is obvious").
37 See, e.g., International Institute for Sustainable Development, Comments onICSID Discussion Paper, "Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID
Arbitration," June 15, 2005, § 3.2, at 6 http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment
_icsid-response.pdf [hereinafter IISD Comments] (explaining that consistency is "a
critical goal" and that "[clonsistency breeds predictability, itself an important goal for
investors, governments and other stakeholders.").
38 NAFTA, for example, expressly provides that arbitration awards are only
binding between the parties. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1136(1), 32 I.L.M. at 646; see
also Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 34(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 2055,U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (not expressly providing that arbitral decisions
are a form of precedent in international law but setting out a hierarchy of other types ofprecedent, including "judicial decisions"); but see ICJ Statute, supra, at art. 59(providing that "the decision of the [International] Court [of Justice] has no binding
force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case").
39 See KENNETH S. CARLSTON, THE ROLE OF ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 264 (1946) (suggesting that the "pronouncements of international tribunals are ofequal value from the standpoint of the development of a system of international
jurisprudence"); Jason L. Gudofsky, Shedding Light on Article 1110 of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Concerning Expropriations: An
Environmental Case Study, 21 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 243, 260 n.46 (2000) (suggesting
that the determinations made by the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal are judicial decisions
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event, arbitrators tend to consider decisions from previous tribunals.
4"
Practitioners, investors, and Sovereigns rely upon such decisions as de
facto precedent and indicators of their potential rights and liabilities.
4'
The OECD has confirmed that treaty awards "have a significant
impact on the State's future conduct.
4 2
As a result, legal inconsistencies in the area of investment
arbitration affect foreign investment decisions, economic development,
and foreign relations. For investors, this means investment
uncertainty. Unable to minimize or even accurately assess the relevant
that "may inform the law of expropriation"); see also Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39
STAN. L. REV. 571, 589 (1987) [hereinafter Schauer, Precedent] (noting that "[e]ven
without an existing precedent, the conscientious decisionmaker must recognize that
future conscientious decisionmakers will treat her decision as precedent"); but see
Thomas Carbonneau, The Elaboration of Substantive Legal Norms and Arbitral
Adjudication: The Case of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, in R. LILLICH, ED.
THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 1981-1983 104, 128 (1984) (suggesting
that awards rendered by the US-Iran Claims Tribunal "have been essentially devoid of
substantive legal content and, as a result, [are] incapable of having much precedential
value"); STEPHEN J. TOOPE, MIXED INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 371, 375, 378,
382-83 (1990) (suggesting awards from the US-Iran Claims Tribunal "nowhere state
expressly what sources of law are being applied," noting awards sometimes do not cite
legal sources for their decisions," discussing the "political pressure" which can manifest
itself in awards, and concluding that "it would be unwise and misleading to treat the
substantive output of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal as highly persuasive authority in
other third-party adjudications of conflicts between states and foreign private parties"
although some decisions "are helpful in other contexts at least by way of analogy"). In
the context of ICSID arbitrations, where most investment treaty disputes are decided,
Professor Schreuer has written an authoritative commentary on the ICSID Convention.
CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 
(2001).
While Professor Schreuer accepts that the doctrine of binding precedent does not apply
between different ICSID tribunals, in analyzing how tribunals refer to and apply
previous decisions, the major assumption of the treatise is that studying previous
decisions is a worthwhile exercise because practices and principles are likely to be
applied again. Gill, supra note 12.
40 David A. Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions; From NAFTA To
the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 679, 689 (2004);
Coe, supra note 17, at 1397; see also Ricardo Olivera Garcfa, Dispute Resolution
Regulation and Experiences In MERCOSUR: The Recent Olivos Protocol, 8 NAFTA L.
& BUS. REV. AM. 535, 544 (2002) (noting tribunals' use of previous awards in the
context of dispute resolution under MERCOSUR).
41 See Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1612; see also Gill, supra note
12 (noting that while there "is no doctrine of precedent in international law, in terms of
one tribunal's decision being binding on a subsequent tribunal, but one only has to read
the awards given in published cases to appreciate the degree to which in practice
previous decisions are treated as soft precedent in a way that, again, does not usually
happen in ordinary commercial arbitration").
42 OECD, Transparency and Third Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute
Settlement Procedures: Statement by the OECD Investment Committee, June 11, 2005,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/3/34
786 913 .pdf [hereinafter OECD Statement].
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commercial risks, the investor is left in an unpredictable situation. As
transaction costs increase, the investor may ponder the utility of
foreign investment given the systemic inefficiencies. 43 For Sovereigns,
these arbitral inconsistencies mean that governments cannot exercise
their legislative and regulatory powers' without exposing themselves
to a litigation risk. 45 Treaty claims amount to more than "bet the
company" disputes; they often become "bet the country" disputes. 46
Economic and political stakes are high, and getting a correct, clear, and
reliable outcome - one explainable to taxpayers who will pay the bill
- is vital.
47
43 For example, given the uncertainty of the scope of investment protection under
BITs, investors may experience difficulty knowing what sort of political risk insurance
they may need to purchase. Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1620 n.469;
but see Joanna Page, Political Risk Insurance: Is It Worth It?, TRANSNAT'L Disp.
MGMT. (June 2005), http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/news/tdm2-
2005_4.pdf (suggesting that investment treaty claims may be "be wider, more effective,
and, since no premium is payable, cheaper" than political-risk insurance).
" In some circumstances, governments have abandoned schemes to regulate
traditional areas arguably because of concerns about investment treaty claims. For
example, cigarette manufactures have used NAFTA to inhibit Canada from enacting
anti-smoking legislation. Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth
Amendment? NAFTA's Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an
International "Regulatory Takings" Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 30, 133 (2003). There
has not been an empirical or systematic analysis of the potential "chilling" effect of
investment treaties on government regulation.
45 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Research Note:
Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements,
UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIT/2005/1 at 15 (Aug. 30, 2005), http://www.unctad.org/sections
/dite-dir/docs//webiteiit20051len.pdf (noting that, irrespective of whether a Sovereign
wins or losses a case, the cost of defending a claim can be quite substantial and can
range from as low as $1 million to $13.8 million per year).
46 See Goldhaber, Investment Court, supra note 35 (noting that the more than thirty
claims brought by investors against Argentina related to the devaluation of the peso
are easily worth $10 billion); see also Paolo Di Rosa, The Recent Wave of Arbitrations
Against Argentina Under Bilateral Investment Treaties: Background And Principal
Legal Issues, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 41, 42-43 (2004) (describing thirty-five
claims against Argentina and noting that millions of dollars are at stake); Policy
Implications, supra note 7, at 4 (noting that 34 of the 37 cases pending against
Argentina relate to its currency crisis).
47 Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1; see also Charles N. Brower et al.,
The Coming Crisis in the Global Adjudication System, 19 ARB. INT'L 415, 424-28 (2003)
[hereinafter Brower et al., Global Adjudication] (describing the problems of multiple
and conflicting awards and quoting one commentator who said inconsistency is"absolutely ridiculous, and highly regrettable for the fact that it makes the law look so
stupid"); infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (describing the fall-out from the
Lauder cases); Goldhaber, Investment Court, supra note 35 (describing the comments of
Professor Brigette Stern related to the Argentina cases where "[y]ou have the potential
... for 20 arbitrations, one problem, and 20 solutions."); Julia Ferguson, California's
MTBE Contaminated Water: An Illustration of the Need For an Environmental
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A. The Inconsistent Decisions
There have been multiple cases with either inconsistent reasoning
or results. Inconsistencies in awards generally devolve from varying
permutations in commercial situations, government conduct, and the
text of the specific treaty right. However, while some divergences
reasonably may be attributed to meaningful distinctions in situation,
conduct, or text; many other cases nevertheless remain problematic.
Some tribunals have evaluated a similar textual provision in a
similar commercial and governmental context, but nevertheless come
to different conclusions about the existence, applicability, or contours
of a claimed right.48 Likewise, tribunals evaluating the same right in
the same treaty - albeit in different commercial contexts - have
rendered divergent rulings upon the meaning and scope of such a
right .
49
Interpretive Note on Article 1110 of NAFTA, 11 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 499,
505 (2000) (suggesting that NAFTA's "lack of certainty for future regulators" is
inappropriate).
48 For example, in the SGS cases, SGS provided customs services to governments,
such as Pakistan and the Philippines, under service contracts. There were problems
under those contracts. SGS brought a claim against Pakistan under the Swiss/Pakistan
treaty alleging a violation of the so-called "umbrella clause;" likewise, SGS brought a
claim against the Philippines for a violation of a textually similar "umbrella clause" in
the Swiss/Philippines BIT. The issue for both tribunals was whether the "umbrella
clause" transforms a breach of contract into a breach of treaty. Essentially, one tribunal
said "yes" and the other said "no." See Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at
1569-74; Soci6t6 G~ndrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID
(W. Bank) ARB/01/13 (Decision on Jurisdiction) (Aug. 6, 2003),
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/SGS-decision.pdf; SGS Socidt6 Gn6rale de
Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/02/6 (Decision
on Jurisdiction) (Jan. 29, 2004), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/SGSvPhil-
final.pdf. Likewise, there is confusion over whether a Most Favored Nation (MFN)
provision permits investors to take advantage of additional rights and, if so, which
rights. Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/97/7, 64 (Jan. 25,
2000) (Decision on Jurisdiction), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Maffezini-
Jurisdiction-English_- 001.pdf (concluding that an MFN provision permitted an investor
to take advantage of a more favorable procedural right in a different treaty); Plama
Consortium Limited v. Bulgaria, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/03/24, 200-223 (Decision
on Jurisdiction) (Feb. 8, 2005), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
plamavbulgaria.pdf (finding that an MFN provision could not be utilized to invoke a
more favorable procedural right).
49 Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1574-81 (describing the trio of
cases in which some cases decided that "fair and equitable" treatment was an additive
right that is distinct from the international minimum standard of treatment whereas
other tribunals concluded that it was not); see also S.D. Myers, Inc. (U.S.) v. Canada,
(UNCITRAL) (Partial Award) (Nov. 13, 2000), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
SDMeyers-lstPartialAward.pdf; Metalclad Corporation (U.S.) v. Mexico, ICSID (W.
Bank) ARB(AF)/97/1 (First Partial Award) (Aug. 30, 2000), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/
documents/MetacladAward-English.pdf; Pope & Talbot Inc. (U.S.) v. Canada,
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The Lauder cases provide a tangible example of the impact of
inconsistency, in the form of different results, where there are related
parties, the same facts, and textually indistinguishable substantive
rights. After the Velvet Revolution, an American financier, Ronald
Lauder, decided to invest in the Czech Republic's first private TV
station. Mr. Lauder originally wanted to invest directly in the Czech
company that would own and operate the TV license. The newly
created Czech Media Council, however, did not permit direct foreign
ownership of the TV license. Instead, Mr. Lauder had to make an
indirect investment in an investment vehicle, which in turn invested in
a joint venture company that used the license, which would actually be
awarded to a local Czech company. Creating TV Nova which - with
its popular programming (including Baywatch reruns and nude
weather forecasts) - became profitable in a year. Many of the profits
were expatriated; and after revisions to the Czech Media Law, the
Czech Media Council changed its mind about the way Mr. Lauder's
investment was arranged. The Media Council then determined that
the structure it previously had required violated the amended Czech
Media Law.5° A series of government investigations occurred that left
the joint venture without use of the TV license and rendered Mr.
Lauder's investment worthless.51
As a U.S. citizen, Mr. Lauder brought a claim against the Czech
Republic under the U.S./Czech Republic BIT. But as he had
structured his investment in TV Nova through a Dutch investment
vehicle, this vehicle also had a claim against the Czech Republic under
The Netherlands/Czech Republic BIT. Mr. Lauder and the Dutch firm
each sought arbitration of their claims under the applicable BIT,
resulting in separate arbitration proceedings in The Netherlands and
the United States. Although based upon a common set of facts and
nearly identical treaty rights,52 on all but one point the two arbitral
(UNCITRAL) (Award on Merits) (Apr. 10, 2001), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
PopeandTalbot-Merit.pdf.
50 Article 12(3) of the 1991 Czech Media Law had provided that "[i]n addition to
conditions stated in paragraph 2, the decision to grant a license also includes conditions
with the license-granting body will set for the broadcasting operator." This was deleted
in the revised law. Likewise, the revised law had a narrower definition of
"broadcaster." Lauder v. Czech Republic, (UNCITRAL) 1 79 (Final Award) (Sept. 3,
2001), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/LauderAward.pdf [hereinafter Lauder Award].
5' Lauder Award, supra note 50. Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic,
(UNCITRAL) (Partial Award) (Sept. 13 2000), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME-
200lPartialAward.pdf [hereinafter CME Award]; see also Franck, Inconsistent
Decisions, supra note 1, at 1559-67.
12 Each treaty must be judged according to the specifically negotiated text;
however, the textual rights in the US/Czech and Netherlands/Czech BITs had
remarkably similar operative provisions. See Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal
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tribunals came to diametrically opposed results. Both tribunals agreed
that Mr. Lauder and his Dutch company had been discriminated
against in the original grant of the TV license. However, the tribunal
organized under the Dutch BIT held that there was also expropriation,
failure to provide full protection and security, breach of an obligation
to provide fair and equitable treatment, and violations of the minimum
standard of treatment required by international law. The tribunal
organized under the U.S. BIT disagreed with each of these
conclusions.
53
These inconsistencies have presented challenges. After the
Lauder awards, there was discussion that the Czech Republic might
consider pulling out of its BITs.54 Meanwhile, Ronald Lauder testified
before Congress about the unfavorable business environment in the
Czech Republic and took out full-page ads in the New York Times
telling U.S. investors why they should not invest in the Czech
Republic.
55
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Czech Rep. & Slovk., arts. 11(2)
and III, Oct. 22, 1991, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/czech-us.pdf
[hereinafter US/Czech BIT] (providing that (1) investment "shall at all times be
accorded fair and equitable treatment," (2) no Sovereign "shall in any way impair by
arbitrary or discriminatory measures the management, use, enjoyment, acquisition,
expansion, or disposal of investments," (3) investment "shall enjoy full protection and
security, and (4) investments "shall not be expropriated or nationalized either directly
or indirectly through measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization except:
for public purpose; in a nondiscriminatory manner; upon payment of prompt, adequate
and effective compensation; and in accordance with due process of law"). Agreement
on Encouragement of Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between the Kingdom of
the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Neth.-Czech Rep.-Slovk.,
arts. 3(1), (2), and 5, Apr. 24, 1991, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/
bits/czech.netherlands.pdf (providing that each Sovereign (1) "shall ensure fair and
equitable treatment of the investments of investors," (2) "shall not impair, by
unreasonable or discriminatory measures, the operation, management, maintenance,
use enjoyment or disposal [of investments] by those investors," (3) shall accord to such
investments full security and protection," and (4) neither Sovereign "shall take any
measures depriving, directly or indirectly, investors of the other ... unless ... (a) the
measures are taken in the public interest and under due process of law; (b) the
measures are not discriminatory; (c) the measures are accompanied by provision for the
payment of just compensation").
53 Lauder Award, supra note 50; CME Award, supra note 51.
s4 See Petra Pasternak, EU, U.S. Treaty Issues Unresolved, PRAGUE POST, May 29,
2003, available at http://www.praguepost.comP03/2003/Art/O5
2 9/busi4 .php (suggesting
that the Czech Republic may have needed to terminate the U.S./Czech BIT).
5- See Peter S. Green, Czech Senate A Safe Haven For Principal In Media War,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2002, at A8 (noting that Mr. Lauder responded with full page
newspaper advertisements calling the Czech Republic unsafe for foreign investors);
Treatment of U.S. Business in Eastern and Central Europe: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on European Affairs of the Comm. On Foreign Relations of the U.S. Sen.,
106th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-33 (2000) (statement of Ronald S. Lauder, Chairman Central
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The Lauder cases are not isolated incidents. Argentina is subject
to multiple treaty claims related to its recent currency crisis; these
different claims may result in divergent applications of the same (or
similar) treaty provisions and different conclusions regarding liability
for the same government conduct.56 As things stand, the problem will
likely grow. Even now, the number of claims under BITs is exploding,
and each one typically alleges damages in excess of US$100 million.
Meanwhile, given the broad definition of "investor" and "investment,"
investors have greater incentives to heed the advice of counsel 57 and
structure their investments through corporate layers with divergent
nationalities to plant the seeds for "twin" or "triplet" cases similar to
Lauder. This allows investors to minimize risks in one way: namely, by
creating future opportunities to game the system and requesting
arbitration of the same claims on behalf of affiliated parties under
multiple BITs from different jurisdictions. Indeed, Tokios Tokeles v.
Ukraine, suggests that prudent investors should pursue this strategy.58
B. The Challenges of Inconsistency
Irrespective of whether the forum is a court59 or an arbitral
European Media Enterprises).
56 There are more than thirty claims brought against Argentina, which involve the
same government measure (the devaluation of the peso). While they involve different
and sometimes related investors, the treaty rights typically involve the same BIT,
textually identical treaty rights, or substantially similar rights. See, e.g., Investment
Claims, Orders and A wards, http://www.investmentclaims.com/oa2a.html. Nevertheless,
these different cases could result in inconsistent substantive determinations as to
Argentina's liability. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (describing the
possibility of inconsistency in the Argentina cases).
17 See, e.g., Allen & Overy, The Rise of Investment Treaty Arbitration,
http://www.allenovery.com/asp/infocus.asp?pagelD=3837; Appleton & Associates, The
Firm: Our Services, http://www.appletonlaw.com/2c-services.htm; see also JULIAN D.M.
LEW, LOUKAs A. MISTELIS & STEFAN M. KROLL, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 769 (2003) (noting that "investments made by a
subsidiary of a global corporation will now fall under at least one BIT.").
-8 See Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/02/18, (Decision on
Jurisdiction) (Apr. 29, 2004), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/tokios-decision.pdf
(holding that a local Ukrainian company that had reincorporated itself in Lithuania
could qualify as a foreign investor and benefit from the protections afforded by the
Ukraine/Lithuania investment treaty).
59 See generally John C. McCoid, II, Inconsistent Judgments, 48 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 487 (2001) (describing the difficulties of inconsistency in the context of domestic
civil court litigation); Lauretta Drake, Stop the Madness! Procedural and Practical
Defenses to A void Inconsistent Cross-Border Judgments Between Texas and Mexico, 9 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 209 (1999) (discussing difficulties caused by inconsistent
judgments in transnational litigation); Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds?
Our Foolish Law ofInconsistent Verdicts, 111 HARV. L. REV. 771 (1998) (describing the
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tribunal,' some inconsistency can be expected in any dispute
resolution system created by human beings. Inconsistency tends to
signal errors, lends itself to suggestions of unfairness, creates
inefficiencies, and generates difficulties related to coherence, 61 most
notably a lack predictability,6 2 reliability,63 and clarity.64 Scholars have
difficulties of inconsistent verdicts within a single criminal trial and suggesting these
result from mistakes, confusion, compromise, or lenity); see also Jessie Allen, Just
Words? The Effects of No-Citation Rules in Federal Courts of Appeals, 29 VT. L. REV.
555, 575-76 (2005) (noting that the desire to "act alike in all cases of a like nature" is an
aspiration principle and that decision makers "are not held to a standard that requires
them to produce entirely consistent outcomes, but they are expected to strive for
consistency to the extent possible").
60 The nature of arbitration itself, where there is no appellate mechanism and few
opportunities to join parties and consolidate claims unless parties agree, leads to
potentially inconsistent results. See Gill, supra note 12; Wolfgang Kiihn, How to Avoid
Conflicting Awards: The Lauder and CME Cases, 5 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 7, 11-15
(2004); Christer Soderlund, Lis Pendens, Res Judiciata and the Issue of Parallel Judicial
Proceedings 22 J. INT'L ARB. 301, 318-20, 322 (2005); see also infra notes 130, 140, 182,
186, 190,192.
61 A previous piece by this author addressed indicators of legitimacy, particularly
determinacy and coherency. See Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1584.
This paper focuses more on by-products of those indicators, namely predictability,
reliability, and clarity. These aspects are critical to investment treaty arbitration as they
implicate an investor's planning of its commercial investments and the legality of
Sovereign's chosen regulation. The predictability, reliability, and clarity of legal
decisions governing investment treaties is fundamental to investors, citizens, and
Sovereigns.
62 Predictability refers to the ability to anticipate future decisions based upon
previous determinations such that individuals can plan for the consequences - legal or
otherwise - of their actions. Scholars have long accepted predictability is a pillar of
the rule of law because it promotes confidence in the rule of law and increases the
efficiency of dispute resolution. Joseph R. Grodin, Are Rules Really Better Than
Standards?, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 569, 570 (1994).
63 Reliability refers to the ability to depend upon previous determination and know
with some certainty that one's conduct conforms to articulated rules and standards. In
this sense, reliability is about the protection of justified expectations and the avoidance
of arbitrary decisions. Such reliability and certainty promotes business innovation and
development by letting firms know what they can and cannot do. Deborah J. La Fetra,
Kick It Up a Notch: First Amendment Protection For Commercial Speech, 54 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1205, 1207-08, 1216 n.72 (2004); Allen, supra note 59, at 578.
64 Clarity is the ability to ascertain and understand both the scope of a law and its
application. Such clarity promotes predictability in the future and the reliance interests
of investors, citizens, and Sovereigns. By eliminating speculation as to what the law is
and avoiding a need for interpretation or explanation, clarity also promotes efficiency
for Sovereigns, businesses, and citizens. See Paul E. Loving, The Justice of Certainty, 73
OR. L. REV. 743, 764 (1994). Some commentators suggest that looking for clarity in the
"law as a whole" falls within rule of law goals of "norm-based" theories of law where
there are common understandings of the meaning of legal rights and duties irrespective
of what a tribunal might do in a particular case. Andrew N. Adler, Translating and
Interpreting Foreign Statutes, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 37, 81 (1997); see also Michael C.
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generally observed these challenges related to inconsistency. 65
However, inconsistency also has marginal benefits that can, in certain
circumstances, enhance the long-term credibility of the dispute
resolution process. These detriments and benefits require further
explication.
1. Error signaling
Inconsistencies tend to reveal flaws in the structure of the system
of resolving disputes and suggest that one (if not more) of the
inconsistent decisions is legally incorrect. When inconsistency reveals
the occurrence of error, "that manifestation of fallibility saps public
confidence in the adjudicatory process and that inconsistency is thus
harmful simply because of its signal."66 Cases such as Lauder suggest
the public perceives such a signal particularly where commentators
openly remark such inconsistency, "brings the law into disrepute [and]
brings arbitration into disrepute"6 7 and "make[s] the law look
stupid.'"68
Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 669-70 (1995).
65 A number of other scholars have articulated that the justifications for adhering to
rules or reasoning elucidated in previous decisions relate to factors such as the need for
certainty and predictability in the law; the propriety in insuring that similarly situated
litigants are treated equally; the judicial efficiency achieved by not reopening every past
decision; and the appearance of justice, the avoidance of arbitrary decision making, and
the value of stability. See generally RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL
DECISION: TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION (1961); Thomas L. Fowler,
Of Moons, Thongs, Holdings and Dicta: State v. Fly and the Rule of Law, 22 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 253, 257-58 (2000); Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367,
368-372 (1988); Schauer, Precedent, supra note 39; Aaron Rappaport, The Logic of
Legal Theory: Reflections on the Purpose and Methodology of Jurisprudence, 73 MiSS.
L.J. 559, 631-32 (2004); Paul W. Werner, The Straits of Stare Decisis and the Utah Court
of Appeals: Navigating the Scylla of Under-Application and the Charybdis of Over-
Application, 1994 BYU L. REV. 633 (1994). While they have tended to focus on U.S.
court decisions and not the awards of international arbitral tribunals, there are other
modem commentaries written on stare decisis and consistency, including but not
limited those referenced in these remarks. See generally LAURENCE GOLDSTEIN, ED.,
PRECEDENT IN LAW (1987); EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
REASONING (1948); Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
(1989); Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in
Stare Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031 (1995); Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial
Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 940, 942-43 (1923); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and
Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281 (1990).
66 McCoid, supra note 59, at 488; see also Allen, supra note 59, at 578-79 (discussing
the relationship between consistency and correctness); but see Peters, supra note 65, at
2034 (arguing consistency can institutionalize erroneous results).
67 Matthew Rushton, Clifford Chance Entangled in Bitter Lauder Arbitrations,
LEGAL BUSINESS, Oct. 2001, at 108.
68 See supra note 48 and accompanying text; see also Goldhaber, Investment Court,
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2. Perceived unfairness
As recalled by Professor Schuaer's classic analysis of consistency
and precedent, there is a concern to "treat like case alike"69 and that
failure to treat similar cases similarly "is arbitrary, and consequently
unjust or unfair."7 Consistency would likely promote the conception
of fairness across the system, while inconsistency may lead to the
opposite result. Although those who win specific cases are unlikely to
complain about the result,71 inconsistencies adversely impact others
immediately affected by the result as well as future users of the
system.72  Indeed, prominent practitioners in investment treaty
supra note 35 (acknowledging the public outcry that "[u]ltimately, there must be a right
answer."); Brower et al., Global Adjudication, supra note 47, at 424-28; Charles N.
Brower & Jeremy K. Sharpe, Multiple and Conflicting International Arbitral Awards, 4
J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 215, 216 (2003).
69 Arthur L. Goodhart, Precedent in English and Continental Law, 50 L. Q. REV. 40,
56-58 (1934); PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY 210-19 (1990); see also Amy C.
Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011 (2003) (discussing the
distinction between consistency as a matter of stare decisis amongst non-parties and as a
matter of issue preclusion between the same parties); Michael D. Bayles, On Legal
Reform: Legal Stability and Legislative Questions, 65 KY. L.J. 631, 639-640 (1977)
(suggesting that the need for certainty relates to fairness to those who have relied upon
the rule, the efficiency of using precedent and the equality of treating similar cases
similarly); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 543 n.20
(1982); but see Anthony D'Amato, Is Equality a Totally Empty Idea?, 81 MICH. L. REV
600, 602 (1983); Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor
Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV 575 (1983).
70 Schauer, Precedent, supra note 39, at 595-96. As Professor Schauer usefully
explains "[t]he idea of fairness as consistency forms the bedrock of a great deal of
thinking about morality. Whether expressed as Kantian universalizability, as the
decisions that people would make if cloaked in a Rawlsian veil of ignorance about their
own circumstances, or simply as The Golden Rule, the principle emerges that decisions
that are not consistent are, for that reason, unfair, unjust, or simply wrong." Id. at 596;
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 33-34 (1921);
Allen, supra note 59, at 575; see also Adler, supra note 64, at 81 (arguing that the
"[p]redictability of judicial decisions is desirable. Probably all legal systems aspire to
protect parties' reliance interests, in order to prevent forum-shopping and to foster
equal treatment, fair notice, stability, and security in private affairs"); but see Peters,
supra note 65, at 2043, 2065-73 (suggesting that such equality based concerns for
adjudicative consistency are not compelling).
71 McCoid, supra note 59, at 489.
72 In particular, there are difficulties related to issues such as planning and
predictability. While Professor McCoid suggests that these difficulties should not be
insurmountable because in many instances "there is simply no planning" based upon
previous decisions, in the case of investment arbitration, there is evidence that investors
and Sovereigns rely on these decisions - and the possibility of recovery or liability -
in planning their activities. See supra note 59; see also Peters, supra note 65, at 2113-14
(suggesting that the goals of predictability and reliability may be illusionary, but
acknowledging they may have more force in commercial and other contexts where
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arbitration suggest that a system which generates inconsistent




Inconsistency can also adversely affect efficiency. A variety of
divergent rules and reasoning does not conserve the arbitral resources
of parties or decision makers. It will cost investors and Sovereigns
more to arbitrate claims in multiple fora, particularly for those cases
where a single tribunal could just as easily decide the disputes. It may
also increase the cost of decision-making as parties and arbitrators
conduct additional analysis and expend additional effort, time, and
money to explain inconsistencies and justify their positions. Without a
stable body of basic, internationally-accepted doctrine, more
consideration of individual questions is required, since there can be




Inconsistency creates other challenges, including lack of
predictability, reliability, and clarity as to the rule of law and its
application.75 Justice Brandeis reminds us that "in most matters it is
more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be
parties plan their conduct in reliance of established doctrine).
73 Goldhaber, Investment Court, supra note 35 (quoting Nigel Blackaby of
Freshfields, Bruckhaus Deringer's Paris office).
74 Schauer, Precedent, supra note 39, at 600; Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and
Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 748 (1988); see also Maltz, supra
note 65, at 370-71 (suggesting that "ability to rely on precedent no doubt simplifies the
task of judging"); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56
STAN. L. REV. 429, 475 (2003) (suggesting efficiency and consistency are valuable when
resolving international disputes); but see Rafael Gely, Of Sinking and Escalating: A
(Somewhat) New Look at Stare Decisis, 60 U. PiTr L. REV. 89, 132-33 (1998) (noting
the efficiency caused by consistency but describing instances when courts ignore the
need for consistency when outweighed by changed circumstances); Wasserstrom, supra
note 65, at 72-73 (suggesting that efficiency is important but that it is not the only factor,
otherwise dispute resolution systems would adopt methods such as flipping coins or
casting dies to eliminate the rigors of legal reasoning).
71 See Miranda Oshige McGowan, Against Interpretation, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
711, 728 (2005) (noting that a failure to consider properly existing precedent may
result in an improper consideration of the cost to "legal coherence, predictability, and
to the principle of treating like cases alike").
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settled right. ' 76 Although "correctness" remains a vital virtue, at times
the mission of law is sometimes to achieve "certainty for certainty's
sake, [and] consistency for consistency's sake. ' 77  For those
participating in the global economy where there may be a variety of
competing standards (or a lack thereof), the rule of law is essential;
without it, there is a detrimental impact upon those governed by the
rules and their willingness and ability to adhere to such rules.
78
Particularly where investors and Sovereigns wish to plan their
investments and government activity, being able to predict how their
conduct will implicate their legal rights and obligations is fundamental.
Without such predictability, reliability and clarity, expectations are
frustrated and there are challenges to the ordering of both public and
private conduct.79 This difficulty has sparked public critique that
demands a more predictable dispute resolution system which allows
"observers to assess which claims may be justified by government
malfeasance, corruption or other mistreatment - and which claims
may pose worrying threats to a government's ability to regulate for
social, environmental or other important purposes." 80
76 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia would have us remember something similar. See Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989)
(explaining that "[r]udimentary justice requires that those subject to the law must have
the means of knowing what it prescribes ... There are times when even a bad rule is
better than no rule at all."). The author is grateful to Professor Richard Rueben for
making her aware of this article.
7 Frederick Schauer, The Generality of Law, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 217, 233 (2004)
[hereinafter Schauer, Law]; but see Peters, supra note 65, at 2115 (suggesting such an
approach is "foolish").
78 Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then Should Judge?: Developing the
International Rule of Law under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 193, 200-02
(2001); Ash 0. B5li, Justice Under Occupation: Rule of Law and the Ethics of Nation-
Building In Iraq, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 431, 454 (2005); Delissa A. Ridgway & Mariya A.
Talib, Globalization and Development - Free Trade, Foreign Aid, Investment and the
Rule of Law, 33 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 325, 335-36 (2003).
79 Peters, supra note 65, at 2039 (noting that precedent provides "advantageous
predictability in the ordering of private conduct, that it promotes the necessary
perception that the law is stable and relatively unchanging, that it prevents frustration
of private expectations, [and] that it serves the resource-saving goal of judicial
efficiency"); see also James B. Bean Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 551-52
(1991) (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (explaining that "stare decisis allows those affected by
the law to order their affairs without fear that the established law upon which they rely
will suddenly be pulled out from under them.").
80 Luke Eric Peterson, Briefing Paper No. 10: UK Bilateral Investment Treaty
Programme and Sustainable Development, at 10 (Feb. 2004), http://www.chathamhouse.
org.uk/pdf/research/sdp/BinvestFeb04.pdf; see also id. at 6 (critiquing the overlapping
and conflicting interpretations of treaty rights).
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5. Beneficial aspects of inconsistency
Inconsistency is not necessarily destructive, however. For
example, inconsistency can provide opportunities both to enhance the
predictability of the law and to offer flexibility when discretion is
desired.81 As regards enhancing predictability, inconsistency can help
identify flaws within the system and thereby offer opportunity to
improve the process of the investment treaty dispute resolution system,
leading to a positive change in the predictability and reliability of
substantive doctrine in future arbitrations. 2  Inconsistency can also
serve as a dynamic laboratory in the development of common and
inter-related substantive rights among BITs. 3 Disagreements between
courts and scholars, for example, can lead to a more considered
jurisprudence.
In addition, facially inconsistent results may not indicate
jurisprudential inconsistency. Facially inconsistent determinations
may be reconcilable through norms of interpretations' that
demonstrate that seemingly dissimilar cases are, in fact, legitimately
distinguishable; likewise such norms might explain why textually
81 Justice Scalia describes this as a "personal discretion to do justice" where there is
minimal reliance on a general rule of law and suggests that it could lead to enhanced
justice as a result of the pronouncement based upon a totality of circumstances rather
than a "judicially pronounced five-part test". Scalia, supra note 76, at 1175-77.
Nevertheless, Scalia suggests avoiding this approach where possible and that instead
"the Rule of Law, and the law of rules, be extended as far as the nature of the question
allows." Id. at 1186.
82 For example, by recognizing a structural problem in the process, an opportunity
to correct the problem can create consistency and "strengthens external credibility, then
minimizing internal inconsistency by standardizing decisions within a decision making
environment may generally strengthen that decision making environment as an
institution." See Schauer, Precedent, supra note 39, at 600.
83 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (stating "[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments"); see also Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States:
Federalism And Constitutional Rights, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1745 (2004); Brower,
FTAA, supra note 12, at 251, 257. While state courts have the capacity to petition the
U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari where common issues of constitutional law are at
issue, in investment treaty arbitration, there is no central repository for uniformly
resolving common issues and rights.
84 Indeed, rather than suggesting tribunals strictly adhere to the doctrine of stare
decisis, which has the capacity to suffer from inefficiency, they might instead choose to
apply a "rule of relevance" to determine which future cases are relevant to their
decision making process. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 39, at 576-579; Martha D.
Pearson, Citation of Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1235, 1253-
54 (2004); Raj Bhala, The Power of the Past: Towards De Jure Stare Decisis in WTO
Adjudication (Part Three Of A Trilogy), 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 873, 950 (2001).
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similar rights should be treated differently. By recognizing
fundamental distinctions, "interpretation of treaties [with] identical or
similar provisions of different treaties may not yield the same results,
having regard to, inter alia, differences in their respective contexts,
objects and purposes, subsequent practice of parties and travaux
prdparatoires. ' '85  Arbitral decisions or commentary that provide
reasonable explanations for making what might otherwise appear to be
inconsistent distinctions can ultimately enhance the credibility and
reliability of the process.
C. Challenges for the Investment Treaty Arbitration Hybrid
Investment treaty arbitration is a hybrid or "mixed" system - a
system that grafts a traditionally private dispute resolution system onto
an international treaty between Sovereigns.86 This hybrid, which
challenges arbitration's historical roots while simultaneously trying to
secure its benefits for a broader group of legal actors, inevitably causes
tension.87 While the complexities caused by inconsistency are more
pronounced in this hybrid, a variety of factors make it functionally
distinct from traditional arbitration.
88
85 The MOX Plant Case, Order on Provisional Measures, 51 (Dec. 3, 2001) 41
I.L.M. 405,413 (Ire.-U.K.).
86 Coe, supra note 17, at 1389-91; see also Todd Weiler, Balancing Human Rights
and Investor Protection: A New Approach for a Different Legal Order, 27 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 429, 430-31 (2004); William W. Park, The Specificity of International
Arbitration: The Case for FAA Reform, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1241, 1299-301
(2003); see also Bernardo M. Cremades & David J.A. Cairns, The Brave New World of
Global Arbitration, 2 J. WORLD INV. 173, 183 (2002) (referring to investment treaty
arbitration as "a hybrid between private arbitration and inter-State arbitration").
87 One commentator suggests that it is "an important challenge to investor-state
tribunals going forward to take a more consistent and institutionally coherent approach
to the conduct of investor-state arbitration proceedings," but he also recognizes that
"[p]rivate, international commercial tribunals historically have tended to focus almost
exclusively on achieving justice in the single case before them. Governments and the
public expect an approach to dispute resolution in public law cases that is more
consistent and coherent across the full docket of cases." Bart Legum, Trends and
Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration, 19 ARB. INT'L 143, 146-47 (2003).
88 See Cremades & Cairns, supra note 86, at 183 (explaining that "Investor-State
arbitration differs fundamentally from traditional international commercial arbitration
in that its basis lies in treaties between States (either multilateral or bilateral) rather
than private agreements. This treaty basis and the State party involvement mean that
public international law has a prominent role in investor-State arbitrations" and
suggesting this distinction "require[s] the re-examination and adaptation of some
fundamental concepts and doctrines of arbitral law"); see also Nigel Blackaby, Public
Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration, 1 OIL & GAS L. INTELL. (2003) available at
http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/article_56.htm (explaining that
"[t]reaty arbitration often raises fundamental issues of public interest which are usually
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1. Origins and Purposes
Investment treaty arbitration has a different origin and purpose
than traditional domestic commercial arbitration.8 9 Investment treaty
arbitration was created to provide a depoliticized dispute resolution
process90 for the adjudication of public law rights.91 It was also created
absent from international commercial arbitration").
89 Investment treaty arbitration is international in nature. Courts, particularly the
U.S. Supreme Court, and legislatures have treated international arbitration differently
because the needs for uniformity and predictability are different from domestic
arbitration. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 684.01-.35 (West 2003) (establishing the Florida
International Arbitration Act); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20
(1974) (noting the importance of a unified system in the context of international
arbitration); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
629-30 (1985) (noting the special needs in the context of international arbitration to be
sensitive to concerns of international comity and the need for predictability in the
resolution of disputes); S6bastien Besson, The Utility Of State Laws Regulating
International Commercial Arbitration and their Compatibility With the FAA, 11 AM.
REV. INT'L ARB. 211, 211-12 (2000) (noting that some U.S. states have adopted a model
international commercial arbitration law).
90 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (describing need for investors to have
home governments espouse claims on their behalf before the ICJ); Outcome of Summit
of the Senate, Americas and Prospects for Free Trade in the Hemisphere, Before
Subcomm. on Trade, H.R. Ways and Means Committee, 107th Cong. 1st Sess., Serial
107-22, 93 (2001) (statement of Daniel M. Price, Member, U.S. Council for
International Business) (explaining that "[1]imiting investment dispute settlement to a
state-to-state procedure will politicize disputes, leaving investors, particularly small-
and medium-sized enterprises, with little recourse save what their government cares to
give them after weighing the diplomatic pros and cons of bringing any particular
claim"); Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1536-38 (describing the shift
away from closed-door diplomatic negotiations or the use of force); Alvarez & Park,
infra note 93, at 366-70 (describing the evolution towards the current regime of
investment treaty arbitration); see also Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth
of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing
Countries, 24 INT'L LAWYER 655, 659 (1990) (noting that in the 1970s the United
Nations had identified 875 acts of government takings in 62 countries over a period of
14 years prior to the promulgation of BITs and indicating the U.S. Department of State
was aware of 102 existing investment disputes between U.S. nationals and foreign
governments, but suggesting that there was no effective protection for vindication of
these rights).
91 Bart Legum is the former head of the NAFTA Claims Division at the U.S.
Department of State and has explained that treaty arbitration involves "matters of
public importance." Mr. Legum has also described the "public law nature of these
cases" and the "strong public interest" which "implicates a number of public and
governmental interests; specific interest in the measure that is challenged in the case;
general interest in the appropriate functioning of the investment protections ... interest
in the appropriate interaction between federal, state and local government authorities;
and many others." Legum, supra note 87, at 144-45, 147 (2003); see also Cremades &
Cairns, supra note 86, at 184-85 (suggesting that investment treaty arbitration is
different in the public nature of the rights involved and the relevance of public
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to provide a neutral forum
92 to avoid perceptions of an unfair
advantage where one of the parties - namely the Sovereign
respondent - would otherwise simultaneously be party, regulator,
legislator and adjudicator.
93  In contrast, domestic commercial
arbitration tends to involve resolving private law disputes;
94 removing
disputes from an international diplomatic dialogue was rarely a
concern of domestic commercial arbitration.
95  Instead, domestic
international law).
92 UNCTAD, Course on Dispute Settlement, International Center for Settlement of
Investment Disputes, 2.1 Overview, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc. 232 (2003),
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232overview-en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD
Overview] (explaining that "[r]ightly or wrongly, the courts of the host State are often
not seen as sufficiently impartial" to render decisions in investment treaty disputes).
93 In contrast to domestic arbitration, where parties may be from the same country,
international commercial arbitration has flourished in part because the parties perceive
it as a neutral forum. William W. Park, Illusion and Reality in International Forum
Selection, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 135 (1995); Guillermo A. Alvarez & William W. Park, The
New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 366-
67 (2003). With a common desire to improve the perceived fairness of the process,
both international commercial and investment arbitration attempt to avoid a perceived
home field advantage in favor of a neutral forum. Nevertheless, concerns about
neutrality are more pronounced in the context of investment treaty arbitration. 
See
Alvarez & Park, id. at 371 (noting that investors historically have had concerns 
that
they would receive a "fair shake" in the event of controversy with the 
host
government). This may be particularly true in countries which are struggling to 
develop
and apply principles related to the rule of law and separation of powers. See Peterson,
supra note 80 (noting that arbitration "can be a highly-attractive proposition,
particularly where local courts are corrupt or unreliable").
94 See Cremades & Cairns, supra note 86, at 192 (stating that "[i]nternational
commercial arbitration is conventionally a form of private, if not always confidential,
dispute resolution."). One notable exception to this is the adjudication of 
certain
statutory actions, such as anti-trust and RICO claims. The use of arbitration to 
resolve
these types of disputes is a relatively new phenomenon in the United States. 
See
E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 296 n.10 (2002) (noting "federal statutory
claims may be the subject of arbitration agreements"); Rodriguez de Quijas 
v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480-81 (1998) (describing the shift in
the U.S. Supreme Court's willingness to arbitrate statutory claims within the past 25-30
years); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (permitting
arbitration of RICO claims); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614 (1985) (permitting arbitration of antitrust claims); Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (permitting arbitration of securities claims). Not 
all
countries, however, permit the adjudication of statutory or public law claims. See LEW
et al., supra note 57, at 199 (noting that although there is a trend towards the 
greater
arbitrability of disputes, this depends upon the country involved and involves 
"a
balancing of the mainly domestic importance of resolving certain matters for 
exclusive
decision of courts with the more general public interest of promoting trade 
and
commerce through an effective means of dispute settlement").
91 UNCTAD Overview, supra note 92, at 7 (stating that domestic courts "will often
lack the technical expertise required to resolve complex international investment
2005]
University of California, Davis
commercial arbitration was traditionally extolled because it promoted
efficiency, decreased the burden on judicial resources, and honored
parties' freedom of contract.96 These factors have less impact in the
context of investment treaty arbitration, where disputes typically take
several years to arbitrate.97  Additionally, it is uncertain whether
allowing parties to choose to arbitrate their investment treaty claims
conserves judicial resources.98 As regards the freedom of contract,
disputes" and "[diomestic courts of other States are usually not a realistic alternative"
because of a lack of jurisdiction or the implications of sovereign immunity).
96 Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-
Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 340 n.85 (2005); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23-25 (1991); see also Margaret L. Moses, Privatized "Justice",
36 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 535, 536-41 (2005) (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court's
jurisprudence and willingness to enforce arbitration agreements even more so thantraditional contractual arrangements). Domestic arbitration also helps remove the
perceived risk of home court bias. See supra notes 33 and 93.
97 In the author's experience, investment treaty arbitrations typically take anywherefrom two to five years to render their decisions. See, e.g., International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes, List of Pending Cases, http://www.worldbank.org/
icsid/cases/pending.htm (listing a variety of cases which go back in time to as late as1998). This is not markedly different from resolving disputes before national courts,
such as those in the United States. See also Jochen Zaremba, International ElectronicTransaction Contracts Between U.S. and EU Companies and Customers, 18 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 479, 519 (2003); see also Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty
Dispute: The Search for Workable Solutions, 72 IOWA L. REV. 473, 475 (1987) (noting
that arbitration does not guarantee disputes will be resolved as quickly or as cheaply asin litigation and "efficiency may be frustrated by any number of dilatory factors before,
during, and after arbitration"). The perception of greater efficiency remains in thecontext of international commercial arbitration; but this may depend in part on theefficiency of the national court system to which arbitration is being compared. Susan D.Franck, The Role of International Arbitrators ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. (forthcoming
2006); see also CHRISTIAN BUGHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION 139-47
(1996) (offering empirical evidence on the cost and speed of international arbitration
but suggesting "on aggregate, international commercial arbitration is moderately faster
but not less costly than litigation in the courts".
98 In some cases, this is because the treaties do not give parties a right to go to court
at all, and they can only arbitrate at a pre-selected arbitral institution. See supra note 31and accompanying text. In other cases, this is because parties have not historically
chosen to bring claims of international law violations before the domestic courts ofSovereigns being accused of wrongful conduct. Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra
note 1, at 1542 n.78 (describing how practitioners are unaware of investors who have
brought international law claims before national courts and suggesting instead thatinvestors may bring domestic claims before domestic courts but if they are aware ofinternational law claims, those are brought before international tribunals). There may
be inefficiencies to permitting national court judges to decide treaty claims; while
judges may be more adept at deciding issues with which they are familiar, namely
domestic commercial law matters, this may be less true in a public international law
context. See Todd Weiler, Metalclad and the Government of Mexico: A Play in ThreeParts, 2 J. WORLD INV. 685 (2001) [hereinafter Weiler, Metalclad] (critiquing national
court judges attempting to decide issues of international law); see also Charles H.
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there are fewer concerns to protect in BIT arbitration. Unlike private
commercial law contracts, treaties involve rights negotiated and
granted between two Sovereigns.
99 As a result, there should be less of
a concern about honoring the freedom of the investor who was neither
a party to the negotiations nor a signatory to the treaty.
10°
2. Impact of Arbitral Awards
Investment treaty arbitration also differs markedly from domestic
commercial arbitration because of the role that awards have played,
continue to play, and will play in the future in the understanding of the
substantive standards articulated in investment treaties. In particular,
there are differences in the de facto precedential nature of the awards,
their distribution to the public, and the reliance upon and use of the
awards by tribunals in their reasoning. As previously mentioned,
investment treaty arbitration awards function as de facto precedent.
10'
Traditional arbitration awards do not serve the same function largely
because the existing body of law and academic literature makes it
unnecessary 10 2 and the awards are not made public.
1 3 The lack of
Brower II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back, 40
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43, 47 (2001) (expressing concerns about the role of national
court judges in investment treaty arbitration); but see Council of Canadians v. Canada,
Court file 01-CV-208141 (Decision by Pepall J.) (Jul. 8, 2005), http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/CoucilofCanadians.pdf (conducting a thorough 
analysis
of public international issues related to NAF'A's constitutionality). If national 
courts
could efficiently resolve both domestic and international law causes of action 
related to
the same factual nexus, this might improve efficiency.
99 LUCY REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 61-62 (2004).
100 While domestic commercial arbitration might arbitrate a statutory right, such as 
a
violation of antitrust laws, investment treaty arbitration is of a different caliber. 
It
involves rights granted not just by one sovereign but two; and, unlike most 
statutory
claims, investment treaty arbitration involves a defendant that is a Sovereign and 
not
another private entity. Arguably, an investor functions as a third-party beneficiary 
of a
BIT.
101 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (describing the de facto
precedential effect of arbitration awards and noting the analogy to other forms 
of de
jure precedent); but see Toope, supra note 39, at 383 (suggesting that, in the context 
of
the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal, that where Sovereigns and private actors are involved 
in
dispute resolution even though a tribunal purports to exert a "respect for the law', 
the
tribunal is forced to display enormous flexibility - it must be willing to compromise.
This has led to an essentially idiosyncratic approach to choice of law and even 
to the
application of substantive legal principles.").
102 In the commercial context, there is already a developed body of de jure
precedent from national courts to which parties and arbitrators may refer and 
upon
which they can rely.
103 Confidentiality is a hallmark of commercial arbitration, and awards are 
not
typically made available beyond the parties. Although a few awards on fundamental
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disclosure means that tribunals or parties may be unaware that their
decisions may be inconsistent.'04  In contrast, investment treaty
arbitration has no fewer than three websites, a new Westlaw database
dedicated to publishing awards 05 and organizations dedicated to
obtaining and distributing information about awards.10 6 To the extent
that disclosure of inconsistent awards publicly signals the shortfalls in
the dispute resolution process, 107 investment treaty arbitration has a
challenge and an opportunity that commercial arbitration does not. 0 8
As a result of the increasingly public dissemination of such awards
and the dearth of de jure BIT precedent, investment treaty awards
exhibit a reliance element that commercial arbitration determinations
issues are published in the Yearbook of International Commercial Arbitration or in
extracted and redacted format by the International Chamber of Commerce, it is
challenging for parties and scholars to obtain actual awards. See, e.g., International
Chamber of Commerce, A wards, http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/
awards/awards.asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2005).
104 In many jurisdictions, there is a presumption that arbitration is confidential. Ali
Shipping Corp. v. Shipyard "Trogir", [1998] 2 All E.R. 136 (Eng.) (determining that
England has an implied duty of confidentiality); but see Esso/BHP v. Plowman, 128
A.L.R. 391 (128) (holding that arbitrations in Australia are not confidential unless the
parties so specify); Olivier Oakley-White, Confidentiality Revisited: Is International
Arbitration Losing one of its Major Benefits?, 6 INT'L ARB. L. REv. 29 (2003). One by-
product of confidentiality is inconsistency. As one practitioner noted, although
different tribunals sometimes come to different decisions about the meaning of the
same language in an insurance policy, "because those previous decisions remain
unpublished and unavailable to third parties, the Tribunals are often unaware of them
and any inconsistencies with their own determinations are subjected to little, if any,
comment." Gill, supra note 12.
1o5 See, e.g., Investment Claims, http://www.investmentclaims.com (last visited Oct.
2, 2005), Investment Arbitration Resources Resource, http://ita.law.uvic.ca/ (last visited
Oct. 2, 2005), and The World Bank Group, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
cases/awards.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2005). Westlaw also recently launched a new
investment treaty arbitration database, APPLETON-ISR. The ICSID Review: Foreign
Investment Law Journal also publishes copies of investment treaty cases.
106 The United Nations recently conducted an investigation to isolate all the known
investment treaty cases. Policy Implications, supra note 7. Likewise, the International
Institute for Sustainable Development, regularly investigates and keeps the public
informed about investment treaty cases. See IISD, Investment Law and Policy News
Bulletin (June 30, 2005), http://www.iisd.org/investment/invest-sd/ (describing how
energy firms are poised to notify Bolivia of potential investment treaty claims and US
and Dutch investors in Estonian railway threaten BIT arbitration).
107 See supra notes 61, 66-68 (describing the difficulty caused by the signaling
function of inconsistency).
108 When cases were first being decided, the distribution of awards may actually
have resulted from an effort to treat "like cases alike." In areas where there is little
precedent and one is dealing with issues of first impression, it is efficient for decision
makers to look to previous decisions of others in related areas. However, one must
have access to the materials to consider the implications for another case.
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lack. In particular, investors, governments, and their counsel rely upon
these awards in planning investments, making policy, and determining
arbitration strategy; predictability and certainty are critical factors for
all of these constituents. 109 In commercial arbitration access to the
developed body of the applicable national law and related academic
literature is readily available, but the same cannot be said for
investment treaty arbitration. Unlike a standard commercial contract
governed by the law of New York or England, investment treaties are
a new form of international law, and the meaning of the substantive
rights granted under them is less tested, and the tribunals have only
recently begun to develop applicable governing principles. But beyond
this gap in developed legal rules, a gap also exists in the scope of
academic literature in the investment treaty area. The ICJ Statute,
which sets out the hierarchy of precedent in international law, lists
academic commentary as one of the sources, albeit subsidiary, upon
which one might justifiably rely in international law decision-making.
110
Accordingly, the relative lack of legal scholarship regarding investment
treaties both belies the early stage of development of the law
governing investment treaties and impedes the further development of
that law.1
3. The Impact of Third Parties
Investment treaty arbitration has an impact on third-parties that
differs decidedly from that created by traditional commercial
arbitration. As Professor Park has explained in the context of
NAFIA, "[m]ore than most commercial arbitration, [investment
treaty] disputes have considerable third-party effects."1
2  The
109 Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1611-12; see also Methanex Corp.
(Can.) v. United States, (UNCITRAL) pt. IV(E) 9 (Final Award) (Aug. 3, 2005),
http://www.state.gov/s/i/c5818.htm [hereinafter Methanex Awaid] (explaining the
United States' position that foreseeability is desirable because otherwise this will
"impede the decision-making processes of policy makers, who may seek to predict
possible impacts of measures that they pass"); OECD Statement, supra note 42, at 11.
110 See ICJ Statute supra note 38, (ranking "judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law").
111 While some scholars were writing in this area in the middle of last century, there
was a dearth of scholarship in this area, which is only now having a resurgence. See
generally INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES
FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Todd Weiler, ed., 2006) [hereinafter Weiler, Leading 
Cases];
MEG KINNEAR, ANDREA K. BJORKLUND & JOHN F.G. HANNAFORD, INVESTMENT
UNDER NAFTA: AN ANNOTATED GUIDE TO NAFTA CHAPTER 11 (forthcoming
2006). More scholarship in this area is nevertheless needed.
112 Park, supra note 86, at 1300; see also Cremades & Cairns, supra note 86, at 193
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Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
acknowledges that "investor-state disputes often raise public interest
issues which are usually absent from international commercial
arbitration."' 13  Even in the context of commercial arbitration, the
impact of multiple parties and/or multiple contracts is one of the most
challenging structural issues that affects the rights of third parties and
the integrity of the dispute resolution system.' 4  Nevertheless, the
impact of multiple parties and/or multiple contracts in investment
treaty arbitration is of a larger magnitude, and the downstream effect
of inconsistency consequently is greater. As an immediate matter,
taxpayers of the respondent Sovereign may be faced with paying an
award that may be legally incorrect,115 and these taxpayers have no
rights within the treaty or other means of redress. 116 The lack of
certainty in investment treaty arbitrations also may affect a
government party's capacity and willingness to regulate or legislate
(describing the challenges related to loss of sovereignty, lack of accountability and
transparency, and other challenges to democratically elected institutions).
113 OECD Statement, supra note 42, at 2; see also Bohuslav Klein, How to Avoid
Conflicting Awards: The Lauder and CME Cases, 5 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 19, 21
(2004) (explaining that "investment arbitrations have a much greater duty, they have
much more power on one hand, but much more responsibility, on the other hand,
because they are playing" with commercial and political interests).
114 Because arbitration is a creature of contract, parties can only be subjected to a
tribunal's jurisdiction to the extent they have agreed. Bringing in third parties or
consolidating related claims is therefore a perennial challenge of arbitration. See
generally Martin Bartels, Multiparty Arbitration Clauses, 2 J. INT'L ARB. 61 (1985);
Stipanowich, supra note 97; Philippe Leboulanger, Multi-Contract Arbitration, 13 J.
INT'L ARB. 43 (1996); see also Irene M. Ten Cate, Multi-Party and Multi-Contract
Arbitrations: Procedural Mechanisms and Interpretation of Arbitration Agreements
Under U.S. Law, 15 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 133, 135-69 (2005) (suggesting that court
systems may be better suited to deal with multiple parties or contracts and
acknowledging the different types of procedural mechanisms such as consolidation,
joinder, intervention, interpleader, impleader, and class actions).
115 See Peterson, supra note 80, at 6 (describing how after the Czech Republic lost an
investment treaty case: "the public sector deficit of the Czech Republic was effectively
doubled - and the government was forced to consider a variety of solutions to
compensate the affected investor, including an increase in value added tax on goods
and services"). If inconsistency goes in a Sovereign's favor and taxpayers need not pay,
they are less likely to complain about the result. An investor might have a different
perspective, however.
116 The Sovereign might, however, take steps to terminate the investment treaty.
See REED ET AL., supra note 99, at 61-62; PAUL E. COMEAUX & N. STEPHAN
KINSELLA, PROTECTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 109
(1996). To the extent that taxpayers might vote in a new administration to terminate or
revise investment treaties, this may increase their capacity to affect indirectly future
investment claims. This presumes, however, that taxpayers in a particular country have
the capacity to elect their government officials democratically, freely and fairly. Some
countries are still monarchies or have challenges in holding free and fair elections.
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freely.'1 7 This affects citizens subject to that Sovereign's legislative and
regulatory authority. Ultimately, investment treaty arbitration "has
developed in a fundamentally new direction ... by leaving the realm of
purely private dispute resolution and entering a sphere with substantial
public characteristics.""1 8
4. Sketching Legal Boundaries
Given the distinctions between investment treaty arbitration and
commercial arbitration, investment treaty arbitration's public, pan-
national role creates a credibility challenge different from that created
by domestic commercial arbitration."
9 The concerns of public citizens,
the expectations of private investors, the needs of governments, the
conduct of foreign relations, and decisions regarding international
development come into play. Justice Scalia reminds us that the "the
establishment of broadly applicable general principles is an essential
component of the judicial process" and that decision makers should
create standards that "establish the margins of tolerable diversity.""
12
When there are no margins, the lack of a predictable and clear
jurisprudence is of concern.
Investment treaty arbitration awards are still sketching out the
meaning of substantive guarantees in investment treaties; and the
inconsistency in some areas demonstrates the legitimate concerns
about the existence of discernible margins.
121 Given the need for
117 See Been & Beauvais, supra note 44 (describing the challenges Canada faced in
promulgating smoking regulations as a result of potential claims under NAFTA);
Matthew Schaefer, Conscientious State Legislators and the Cultures of Compliance and
Liberalization Relating to International Trade Agreements, 95 AM. SOCY INT'L L.
PROC. 52 (2001) (suggesting that treaties like NAFTA can and should have an impact
on contentious legislators); but see Janine Ferretti, NAFTA and the Environment: An
Update, 28 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 81, 84 (2002) (commenting that "it is difficult to identify
whether a regulatory 'chill' is happening"); David I. Spector, Note, Trade Treaty
Threats and Sub-National Sovereignty: Multilateral Trade Treaties and Their Negligible
Impact on State Laws, 27 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 367, 369 (2004) (suggesting
that under NAFTA's trade context, states are generally free to legislate without fear of
actual harm for violating a U.S. trade obligation).
118 Cremades & Cairns, supra note 86, at 208.
119 See Legum, supra note 91, at 146 (noting that in the context of investment
arbitration "[c]onsistency in dispute resolution procedures, in particular, serves
important institutional purposes").
120 Scalia, supra note 76, at 1185, 1186.
121 Some claims, such as the right to "fair and equitable treatment" and the
obligation to "honor its commitments" have been articulated for the first time in
investment treaties and there is little jurisprudence from which to draw in "establishing
the margins" of these rights. Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1530-33.
Meanwhile, rights such as guarantees of most favored nation or national treatment are
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predictability, reliability and certainty in this hybrid forum with public
implications, striving towards a goal of more consistency - rather than
less - is a useful undertaking. 122
The challenge created by inconsistency is, like many things, a
question of degree. Where a dispute turns upon its particular facts or
the totality of the circumstances, the parties and their lawyers must
serve their function within the system and make an individual
assessment of the case. 123 Where matters get more complex - with a
higher degree of predictability expected and desired - is when the
relatively untested in the context of investment law; there are some cases analyzing this
in the international trade context, but there are suggestions that these cases graft
uneasily into the context of investment treaty rights. See Occidental Award, supra note
10, at 174-76 (citing to WTO Appellate Body Report, Korea-Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages, Feb. 17, 1999, 118, www.wto.org, but suggesting that the use of "like
products" used in the WTO trade context is distinguishable from "like situations" in the
investment treaty context); see also David A. Gantz, Dispute Settlement Under the
NAFTA and the WTO: Choice of Forum Opportunities and Risks For the NAFTA
Parties, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1025, 1103 (1999).
The law of expropriation might stand as one exception to this assertion. There is case
law, for example, related to expropriation of investments in other contexts, such as
national laws related to expropriation or international cases before the U.S.-Iran
Claims tribunal or the International Court of Justice. International Technical Products
Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 196-302-2, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 273 (1985); Elettronica
Sicula S.p.A. (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20). Nevertheless, there have been
difficulties establishing the content of expropriation law, particularly in areas related to
regulatory takings and creeping expropriation. Been & Beauvais, supra note 44;
Matthew C. Porterfield, International Expropriation Rules and Federalism, 23 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2004).
122 As arbitrators in the investment treaty context function more like neutral
adjudicators - similar to independent judges adhering to the rule of law rather than"commercial men" making unreasoned, compromise awards - focusing on and
promoting consistency is a laudable objective. See Susan D. Franck, The Liability of
International Arbitrators: A Comparative Analysis and Proposal for Qualified
Immunity, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L COMP. L. 1, 15-25 (2000) (analyzing the similarity of
arbitrators and judges); see also International Law Association/Project on International
Courts and Tribunals, Study Group on the Practice and Procedure of International
Courts and Tribunals, Pre-Final Text on Judicial Independence: The Burgh House
Principles on the Independence of the International Judiciary, http://www.pict-pcti.org/
(last visited Dec. 5, 2005) (setting out principles of judicial conduct for international
arbitrators); see also Catherine Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A
Functional Approach to Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 53, 84-
119 (2005) (focusing on the adjudicative functions of arbitration and recommending
greater impartiality of international arbitrators).
123 Likewise, it is the function of arbitrators to comply with their mandate and
exercise the quasi-judicial function of resolving disputes in a fair and impartial manner,
according to the facts and law of the case. As Justice Scalia suggests, it is "rare,
however, that even the most vague and general text cannot be given some precise,
principled content - and that is indeed the essence of the judicial craft." Scalia, supra
note 76, at 1183.
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case invokes legal rules at a higher level of abstraction, such as the
meaning of "fair and equitable treatment" or the meaning to be
attributed to a particular, specialized type of treaty obligation.1 24 The
challenge for investment treaty arbitration is to secure the benefits of
inconsistency while minimizing the burdens in order to optimize the
efficiency and reliability of the dispute resolution process.
III. THE NEW FRAMEWORK
Given the concerns about the inconsistency and the legitimacy of
the current investment arbitration system, there have been a plethora
of ad hoc suggestions. 125 There is an emerging literature about the
most effective methods for evaluating suggestions for reform and
improving the efficiency and consistency of the investment treaty
dispute resolution system.
126
A. Types of Reform Efforts
Suggestions and efforts for reform generally break down into four
categories: (1) the barrier building approach; (2) the arbitration
rejecter approach; (3) a legislative approach; and (4) the safeguard
124 Gill, supra note 12.
'2 See generally Danile R. Loritz, Corporate Predators Attack Environmental
Regulations: Its Time to Arbitrate Claims Filed under NAFTA's Chapter 11, 22 LOY.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L REV. 533 (2000); Stuart G. Gross, Inordinate Chill: Bits, Non-
NAFTA MITs and Host-State Regulatory Freedom - An Indonesian Case Study, 24
MICH. J. INT'L L. 893 (2003); Lucien J. Dhooge, The North American Free Trade
Agreement and the Environment: The Lessons of Metalclad Corporation v. United
Mexican States, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 209 (2001); Robert K. Paterson, A New
Pandora's Box?: Private Remedies for Foreign Investors Under the North American Free
Trade Agreement, 8 WILLAMETrE J. INT'L & DisP. RESOL. 77 (2000); Julie A. Soloway
& Jeremy Broadhurtst, What is in the Medicine Chest for Chapter lI's Ills, 36 CAN. Bus.
L.J. 388 (2002); Stephen Clarkson, Systemic or Surgical? Possible Cures for NAFTA's
Investor-State Dispute Process, 36 CAN. BUS. L.J. 368 (2002); Ari Afilalo,
Constitutionalization Through The Back Door: A European Perspective on NAFTA's
Investment Chapter, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (2001); Samrat Ganguly, The
Investor-State Dispute Mechanism (ISDM) and A Sovereign's Power to Protect Public
Health, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 113 (1999); Joel C. Beauvais, Regulatory
Expropriations under NAFTA: Emerging Principles & Lingering Doubts, 10 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 245 (2002).
126 Professor Brower took one of the first steps toward creating a framework of
analysis in his seminal piece describing the indicators of legitimacy in the context of
investment arbitration by borrowing largely from the work of Professor Thomas Franck
in the public international law context. Brower, Structure, supra note 12; THOMAS M.
FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990); THOMAS M.
FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995). Since then,
this work has been expanded and evaluated more systematically. See generally Franck,
Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1.
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builder approach. The "barrier building" (or gatekeeper) approach
focuses on creating hurdles that limit an investor's direct access to
arbitration to prevent the evaluation of the investor's substantive
rights. The "arbitration rejecter" approach views arbitration as an
inappropriate mechanism, preferring that the substantive rights of
parties to an investment treaty dispute return to a public forum. The
"legislative" approach focuses on changing the text of treaties to
provide greater clarity about the content and scope of investment
rights. Meanwhile, "safeguard builders" suggest that the structure of
investment arbitration can be modified to provide procedural
safeguards that enhance the efficiency and reliability of the dispute
resolution process.1
27
In order to evaluate the utility of these approaches, one must
evaluate whether each generates a jurisprudence that is more
consistent, predictable, and clear. Providing such predictability and
clarity fosters the integrity of the dispute resolution process; likewise, it
can create opportunities to enhance the utility of investment treaties.
The recommendations of the barrier builders and arbitration
rejecters are unlikely to result in a consistent jurisprudence. In
contrast, advocates of a legislative approach and safeguard building
may have more useful suggestions. While the efforts of legislative
reformers may be useful in creating certainty for treaties negotiated in
the future, safeguard building reforms are most likely to have an
immediate and effective impact in creating consistency and offering
enhanced predictability about the meaning of substantive rights in
investment treaty arbitration.
B. Disregarding Consistency: Barrier Builders and Arbitration
Rejecters
The approaches of barrier builders and arbitration rejecters
appear unlikely to develop a more consistent jurisprudence upon
which investors and Sovereigns can rely. Rather, they are likely to
inhibit the development of a consistent and predictable jurisprudence
and may, in come circumstances, exacerbate the difficulties caused by
inconsistent awards.
The approach of "barrier builders" or "gatekeepers" is designed
to inhibit access to arbitration. These advocates recommend imposing
procedural barriers, such as requiring government ministers screen and
reject otherwise colorable claims. Procedural barriers are likely to
decrease the number of claims brought to tribunals.1 28 If fewer cases
127 Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1587-1610.
128 See Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1589-94 for a general
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need to be resolved, the number of inconsistent awards may also
decrease. Nevertheless, this option neither addresses how to prevent
inconsistency in cases being arbitrated nor explains or rectifies existing
inconsistent decisions. Instead, by preventing tribunals from
considering the nature of an investor's rights and a Sovereign's
responsibilities, there is a risk that barrier building will prevent the
development of jurisprudence that might otherwise provide guidance
and clarity on the meaning of treaty rights.
129
Another theoretical approach to resolving the problem of
inconsistent arbitral awards is that forwarded by "arbitration
rejecters." Arbitration rejecters recommend eradicating arbitration
and returning investment disputes to a public forum, such as a national
court.130 Concerned with the integrity of the process, arbitration
discussion of the approach and critique of the barrier building approach.
129 Arguably, by increasing the number of claims, there is a concomitant risk of
inconsistencies arising. Practice suggests, however, that this theoretical risk may not be
significant as tribunals do tend to consider the reasoning of other tribunals and many
arbitrators have repeated appointments as investment treaty arbitrators. See Franck,
Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1597-98 nn.372-75 (describing arbitrators who
have been repeatedly appointed in investment treaty arbitrations). For example
Professor Francisco Orrego Vicufia is a Professor of International Law at the Law
School of the University of Chile and has been a member of various tribunals brought
under investment treaties, including Fedax N. V. v. Venezuela, Maffezini v. Kingdom of
Spain, Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, AES Summit Generation Ltd. v.
Republic of Hungary, Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, CMS Gas v. Argentine
Republic, PSGE Global Inc. v. Republic of Turkey, Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine
Republic, Camuzzi Int'l S. A. v. Argentine Republic, and Joy Mining Machinery Ltd. v.
Arab Republic of Egypt. See Prof. Dr. Francisco Orrego Vicufia, Heidelberg Center for
Latin America, http://www.heidelberg-center.uni-hd.de/english/cv-orrego.html (last
visited Dec. 5, 2005).
130 Professor Michael Reisman has suggested a slightly different non-arbitral
approach - namely the creation of one single body for resolving claims brought by
investors under investment treaties. W. Michael Reisman, Control Mechanisms in
International Dispute Resolution, 2 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 129, 136-37 (1994); see also Loritz,
supra note 125, at 548-49; Coe, supra note 17, 1451-52 (suggesting that the ICJ might
amend its statute to take primary jurisdiction. Such a body could go a long way towards
providing a consistent doctrine as it would provide "one stop shopping" for the
resolution of treaty claims. It might also have useful rules for consolidation and joinder
of related claims. Such a body would foster the rule of law and likely promote
predictability, reliability, and clarity within the doctrine, which is important in a hybrid
area with the public implications of investment treaty arbitration. This approach would
sacrifice certain benefits, however. In particular, although there would be certain gains
in the efficiency in the resolution of related disputes, there would also be certain costs.
Such a system may be inefficient and take longer to resolve claims than ad hoc arbitral
tribunals. As experience from the US-Iran Claims Tribunal suggests, which is still
deciding cases from the 1970s, this could be a very laborious exercise. Likewise, there
will be no tribunals to act as a "dynamic laboratory" and to test and develop the law.
See Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1599. Another challenge to such a
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rejecters assert that arbitration is not an appropriate venue for
resolving treaty claims. Rather, they suggest other fora are more
appropriate because arbitrators are unaccountable,13' the disputes
involve public rights, and a decision with democratic implications is
subjected to an undemocratic process.
13 2
Arbitration rejecters overvalue concerns about the integrity of the
process, which can and should be addressed,'33 and undervalue
concerns about the integrity of the result or the clarity of the
doctrine. 134 The suggestion of returning issues to a variety of national
courts could be viewed as antithetical to the goal of consistency. One
need look no further than the emerging transnational judicial dialogue
in other areas of international law and jurisprudence to see that courts,
like arbitral tribunals, can reach disparate decisions on similar issues. 35
standing body would be the loss of party control in picking arbitrators. Typically party
choice of arbitrator allows parties to "buy in" and believe they have more control over
the process and the ultimate award. By establishing a single tribunal to hear all
investment treaty claims from all countries, individual investors and Sovereigns would
loose the ability to pick an arbitrator that works for their specific needs in a specific
case. Nevertheless, the theoretical utility of such an approach must not be overlooked.
13, This does not address how that national court judges can also be criticized for
being "unaccountable". For example, the U.S. judiciary was recently described as
unaccountable decisionmakers. See Kathy Lohr, Analysis: Christian Telecast Educates
Faithful on High Court, Remarks of Dr. James Dobson (transcript from NPR radio
broadcast Aug. 15, 2005), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
Storyld=4800037, (discussing the "unelected, unaccountable and often arrogant
judiciary").
132 See Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1594-1601 for a critique of the
approach of Arbitration Rejecters and suggestions about how to address their concerns
without abandoning the arbitration system.
133 While ensuring the integrity of the arbitration process is an important element of
its legitimacy, there are a variety of mechanisms to address this issue. See Franck,
Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1596-99; see also infra notes 149-96 (describing
safeguard building reforms to enhance the legitimacy and consistency of investment
treaty arbitration).
134 This lack of concern about consistency, in the context of investment treaty
arbitration, overlooks the value of: (1) investors having predictable standards to plan
their investments, (2) Sovereigns having reliable benchmarks through which to evaluate
their governmental conduct, and (3) citizens having confidence in the integrity of a
process which has a downstream effect upon their lives. See discussion supra Parts
II(B) and II(C) (describing the value of consistency and its unique challenges in the
context of investment treaty arbitration).
13. See generally Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of
Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO.
L.J. 487 (2005) (describing cases from foreign courts where they may consider other
foreign precedent but may not adopt their reasoning or come to similar results); see also
Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 570 (8th Cir. 1998) (considering foreign judicial
decisions and explaining why the court is rejecting the views of these other courts); but
see Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1103-04
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As explained by Justice Story in the context of state court judges,
"Judges of equal learning and integrity, in different states, might
differently interpret.., a treaty of the United States" and this was why
an interrelated federal system needed a structural safeguard - namely
appellate review - to promote consistency.
13 6
A series of different national courts coming to different
conclusions is unlikely to provide a uniform and clear jurisprudence.
Particularly where the local judiciary may be swayed by local concerns
or feel unprepared to address questions of international law - rightly
or wrongly, there may be concerns as to whether national court judges
can or will follow the applicable rule of law.
137 A variety of national
courts, some of which may not be guided by the rule of law but are
instead affected by parochial influences or corruption, are unlikely to
create reliable jurisprudence. Ultimately, using a network of national
courts is unlikely to bring enhanced consistency to jurisprudence of the
investment treaty network.'3 8
To the extent that arbitration rejecters do express a concern for
consistency, they appear to follow Justice Story's lead and recommend
(2000) (discussing the role of national courts in an emerging global legal system and
suggesting "these relationships enhance the salience and impact of international law").
136 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). The author is grateful
to Professor Michael Pitts for pointing her to this case. See also William W. Burke-
White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal Law
Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 67-69 (2002) [hereinafter Burke-White Community
of Courts]; William W. Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law
Enforcement, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 729, 757 (discussing fragmentation in international
law).
137 Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 95 (1998);
Ronald J. Daniels & Michael Trebilcock, The Political Economy of Rule of Law
Reform in Developing Countries, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 99, 131-32 (2004); see also Todd J.
Zywicki, The Rule of Law, Freedom, and Prosperity, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 1-2
(2003) (describing how in Eastern Europe "societies have struggled to rediscover the
rule of law" and how in "impoverished kleptocracies of Africa, the challenge is even
greater and the lack of even embryonic rule of law institutions is stark"); Frank K.
Upham, Who Will Find the Defendant If He Stays With His Sheep? Justice In Rural
China, 114 YALE L.J. 1675, 1709 (2005) (noting that "basic court judges in rural China
have little in common with the visions dancing in senators' heads when they condition
aid on progress toward the rule of law"); but see Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, A USFTA Briefing 4: Message from the Minister for Trade (2003),
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us-fta/newsletter/ausfta_4_03.html
(discussing comments by the Australian Trade Minister explaining the lack of investor-
state dispute settlement in the US/Australia FTA by explaining "both Australia and the
US have strong, independent and robust legal systems, which provide an effective
avenue for our investors to pursue issues of concern to them. In that light, the need to
create an alternative ISDS mechanism in an FTA ... appears less compelling than it
might be in other agreements.").
138 Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1601.
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implementing a safeguard in the form of a transnational appellate
body.1 39 This reform would be challenging to implement because there
is unlikely to be a cohesive political will to create such a supra-national
body.
1 40
C. Minimizing Inconsistency: Legislative Reformers and Safeguard
Builders
Both legislative reformers and safeguard builders offer suggestions
that address consistency more effectively and efficiently. Their
recommendations for reform provide opportunities to minimize
inconsistency through indirect, direct, and hybrid routes.
"Legislative" reformers advocate reducing inconsistency by
providing enhanced textual clarity about the meaning of substantive
rights. While some proponents of legislative reform have suggested
simply eliminating inconsistently interpreted or ambiguous rights,
legislative reformers typically recommend providing detailed
definitions to give arbitrators clearer directives.1 41  For instance,
legislative reformers might suggest that if investment treaties
guarantee freedom from "arbitrary and discriminatory treatment,"
Sovereigns may usefully include definitions for "arbitrary" and
"discriminatory" in their treaties. 142 This approach has two benefits.
139 See Afilalo, supra note 12, at 280 n.8, 288 n.45 & 289 n.51 (describing the need for
a NAFTA appellate body similar to the framework used in the European Union);
Paterson, supra note 125, at 122-23 (recommending access to domestic courts be linked
with a transnational court of appeal); see also discussion infra Part III(C) (describing
the approach of safeguard builders).
140 The same is not true for an appellate mechanism in the context of investment
treaty arbitration. See infra note 186 (describing the United States' Trade Promotion
Authority Act, which requires Sovereigns to consult on the creation of an appellate
body); note 185 and accompanying text (noting how CAFTA-DR requires signatories
to consult on the creation of an appellate body); note 182 and accompanying text
(discussing ICSID's proposal for an appellate body); but see ICSID, Suggested Changes
to the ICSID Rules and Regulations: Working Paper of the ICSID Secretariat, May 12,
2005, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/052405-sgmanual.pdf [hereinafter ICSID
Working Paper] (indicating that ICSID believes it is premature to attempt to establish
an appellate body at the current time).
141 See Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1588-89 (describing and the
approach of legislative reformers and offering a critique of their approach).
142 See US/Czech Republic BIT, supra note 15, at arts. 1(1)(f), 2(2)(b) (prohibiting
arbitrary or discriminatory measures and providing a definition of "nondiscriminatory"
but not "arbitrary"); Agreement of the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and
the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe for the Promotion and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments, Feb. 18, 2000, art. 2(2), http://www.unctad.org/sections/
dite/iia/docs/bits/thailandzimbabwe.pdf (prohibiting only the impairment of
investment by "unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory measures" but failing to
define these terms).
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First, it permits Sovereigns to choose more precisely which rights they
wish to grant investors. Second, by elucidating the parameters of
investor's substantive rights, this approach brings enhanced textual
clarity to an individual treaty, which should generate consistent
interpretation and application of matters under that treaty.
Legislative reformers currently leave untapped an opportunity for
enhancing consistency. They could suggest revising procedural rights
in investment treaties. By implementing and defining certain
structural safeguards in the text of a treaty's dispute resolution
provision, Sovereigns could create procedural enhancements that,
which do not inhibit access to arbitration but nevertheless minimize
the risk that different tribunals will reach inconsistent decisions.
143
Despite the promise of the legislative approach, there are certain
limitations. First, there is a risk that over-definition of rights may
spawn more issues for litigation, which may also result in inconsistency.
Second, renegotiating and revising the terms of more than 2100
bilateral investment treaties presents political challenges. As a
practical matter, it means that legislative reformers are likely to
enhance certainty and consistency only prospectively and on a treaty-
by-treaty basis.'" The has a marginal impact on reducing inconsistency
throughout the remainder of the investment treaty network.
In contrast, safeguard builders offer solutions that may more
efficiently and effectively address the challenges raised by inconsistent
awards. Safeguard builders view arbitration as a useful forum for
resolving treaty claims but acknowledge that structural safeguards
could be put in place to enhance the efficacy of the dispute resolution
process. By adapting the system to account for the challenges unique
to investment treaty claims, safeguard builders hope to foster a dispute
resolution system that reaches consistent, predictable, and reliable
outcomes, in which the public, Sovereigns, and investors can have
confidence.
145
The safeguard building approach also provides an opportunity to
create reform on a multi-lateral rather than treaty-by-treaty basis.
146
Considering treaties in isolation cannot resolve inter-connected rights,
143 See infra notes 146, 153, 167 and accompanying text (describing structural
safeguards that could be implemented in a treaty itself).
144 Although the change is slow, there is some evidence that this occurring now. See
UNCTAD Research Notes on Recent Developments, supra note 45, at 4-7 (suggesting
that older generations of BITs are being replaced by a new generation of BITs with
more particularized treaty rights).
145 Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1601-25.
146 For example, revision of arbitral rules, the creation of an appellate body, and the
development of an academic literature all provide safeguards on a multi-lateral basis.
See infra notes 156-58, 182-87 and accompanying text.
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since the treaties have common roots and are intimately related. 47
While not identical, the more than 2100 existing BITs do have a high
degree of uniformity in the substantive rights granted to investors.148
Promoting the integrity of the network is therefore critical.
While no system of dispute resolution is perfect, safeguard
building measures will promote the integrity of the dispute resolution
process and increase the likelihood that investment treaty awards are
decided in a consistent manner that results in consistent awards. Three
different types of safeguard building measures have been proposed as
means of achieving these objectives. First, safeguard builders
recommend procedural mechanisms that can indirectly minimize the
risk of obtaining conflicting decisions. These mechanisms increase a
tribunal's ability to make fully considered and informed decisions in
order to decrease the likelihood that awards will be decided
inconsistently. Second, safeguard builders suggest the creation of
institutions to rectify inconsistency, providing a direct method of
ensuring consistency. Finally, there are hybrid mechanisms, which
combine aspects of indirect and direct safeguard building methods in
an effort to more comprehensively address current arbitral
inconsistencies and foster the development of a predictable, reliable
and clear jurisprudence.
1. Indirect Methods to Improve Consistency
Participants in and users of investment arbitration could adopt a
variety of safeguards to provide opportunities to engage in considered
decision-making. These reforms generally include measures designed
to improve the transparency of the dispute resolution process, allow
appropriate third-party participation in that process, and address the
need for legal assistance to promote the equality of arms149 while
147 See Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1526-27, 1618-19 (gathering
sources and describing the evolution of investment treaties and the interconnected
nature of the substantive rights).
148 Kaj Hob6r, Has the Proliferation of BITs Gone Too Far: Is it Now Time for a
Multilateral Investment Treaty?, 90 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 93, 93 (2004).
149 Equality of arms is traditionally a concept associated with fairness of
proceedings, particularly in criminal law. It is rooted in the idea that there should be a
reasonable opportunity to present a case. As explained by one scholar, "[t]he concept
of equality of arms is one feature embedded within the wider concept of a fair trial.
The concept requires a sense of "fair balance" between the parties. In instances
involving opposing private interests... "equality of arms implies that each party must
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case - including his evidence -
under conditions that do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-A-vis his
opponent." Michael Hayes Biderman, A Potentially Dubious New Front in the War on
Terrorism: State-Sponsored Civil Suits and the Omagh Bombing, 14 TRANSNAT'L L. &
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resolving disputes.
Giving tribunals and parties access to awards (and the documents
that support the tribunal's reasoning) provides a useful opportunity to
promote consistency. Tribunals can inform their own reasoning by
considering the determinations and analysis of previous tribunals faced
with similar issues; investors and Sovereigns can better plan their
business or regulatory activities based on prior arbitral awards and
reasoning; and citizens can be aware of the potential downstream
implications of all arbitral decisions. At present, because of the
confidentiality traditionally associated with arbitration, transparency
occurs on an ad hoc basis (if at all) in investment arbitration.
150 This
means, without party consent, awards need not be made public,
pleadings and transcripts cannot be obtained, and hearings on public
issues are not open to the public. Nevertheless, arbitration awards
have found themselves in the public domain with increasing
frequency,15' and ICSID's recent proposals recommend changing its
institutional rules to require the mandatory publication of excerpts of a
tribunal's "legal conclusions.'
152
CONTEMP. PROBs. 803, 816-17 (2004).
150 There have been some indications that parties are more willing to open their
proceedings to the public. See NAFTA Free Trade Commission Joint Statement,
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/trade/nafta-alena/statement-en.asp (discussing agreed
transparency obligations). For NAFIA proceedings, subject to the need to protect
specific sensitive information, Canada has declared it will consent to public hearings to
which it is a party, and encourage investors to do the same. Statement of Canada on
Open Hearings in NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitrations, http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/nafta-alena/open-hearing-en.asp (last visited Dec. 5, 2005). The public
hearings in UPS v. Canada, Methanex v. United States and Canfor v. United States are
evidence of this trend. See http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/ups.htm,
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/methanex.htm, and http://www.worldbank.org/
icsid/canfor.htm; see also supra notes 167-70 (describing the increased transparency and
access to documents in investment arbitration).
1-1 There are many websites that make an effort to publish these awards. See supra
note 105 and accompanying text. However, this does not stop the underground trading
of awards among well-connected individuals. In practice, this may mean that some
attorneys have access to awards which others do not. Particularly given the variety of
divergent standards of professional ethics and obligations that might be involved, one
might realistically imagine an attorney failing to disclose a case which might otherwise
adversely affect his case. See Blackaby, supra note 88, (noting that "[a]ccess to many of
the decisions is through a network of law firms active in this area; whilst it benefits the
members of that 'magic circle' it is not right that those firms should have a wider array
of jurisprudence with which to fight their case. Access should be equal to all -
whether the sole practitioner [is] in middle America (who have been active in these
cases) or the international law firm in Paris or Washington."). Likewise, an attorney
might be prohibited from disclosing a case that might positively impact their case
because of an ongoing obligation to a client to keep an award confidential.
152 ICSID Working Paper, supra note 140, at 9; see also ICSID White Paper, supra
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ICSID's proposal may not go far enough, however. Excerpting
only the legal conclusions reached in connection with an award has
many implications. First, it prevents tribunals from having a full
factual context and a thorough appreciation for the legal reasoning
that underlies the excerpted "legal conclusions. 1' 53 Moreover, for
scholars, tribunals, or others who wish to understand the bases for a
decision, whether stated or unstated, the lack of access to underlying
pleadings and transcripts is problematic. 154 Second, the lack of public
dissemination fosters the underground trading of awards. This
prevents equality of arms between parties who do not have the same
knowledge of or access to recent or unpublished opinions. 155
Irrespective of whether a party does not have access to an award or
wishes to conceal an adverse decision, tribunals may be prevented
from considering the analysis of previous tribunals who have dealt with
analogous issues.
The primary institutions that tend to administer investment treaty
cases, such as ICSID, the ICC, and the SCC might therefore consider
amending their rules or creating a protocol to provide for enhanced
and timely access to awards and underlying materials related to
investment treaty arbitration. 156  Permitting public dissemination of
awards, pleadings, and transcripts, will provide opportunities for
critique and scholarship, which may also aid in the development of a
note 36.
153 This may be a basis for the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development's recent recommendation for the publication of arbitral awards, subjectto the necessary safeguards to protect confidential business or governmental
information. OECD Statement, supra note 42.
154 Certain countries, particularly the United States and Canada, have provided that
hearings will be open to the public. Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-Disputing Party Participation, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-alena/Nondisputing-
en.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2005). For these countries, the public may be able to access atranscript of the hearing if they are unable to attend. See U.S Department of State,
Methanex v. United States of America, http://www.state.gov/s/1/c5818.htm (last visited
Dec. 5, 2005) (posting the transcripts for the nine days of hearings).
155 OECD Statement, supra note 42, at 11; see also supra note 149 and
accompanying text (explaining the importance of equality of arms).
156 See supra notes 25 (describing an investor's broad range of options for bringing
claims); see also Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1, at 1541 n.75 (discussing
which institutions get investment treaty claims); Policy Implications, supra note 7, at 5,11 (indicating that approximately 106 treaty claims are brought at ICSID, 39 are ad hoc
UNCITRAL arbitrations, and the 15 remaining cases have been brought before theSCC or ICC). Revising the rules of ICSID would go a long way towards addressing
these concerns as a majority of cases proceed through ICSID. As many cases alsoproceed on an ad hoc basis under UNCITRAL Rules, it may be useful for UNCITRAL
to issue revised rules. Likewise, in light of their increasing case load, the SCC and ICC
may wish consider appropriate revisions to their rules.
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consistent jurisprudence. Ensuring parties have equal access to the
same awards - and are able to make arguments based upon those
awards - should also aid tribunals in making reasoned and considered
awards. This level of transparency indirectly provides tribunals with
information to develop consistent jurisprudence in an efficient manner.
Indeed, the publication of awards will "contribute to the further
development of a public body of jurisprudence...and ultimately
contribute to a more predictable and consistent system."'
157 Moreover,
once in place, modifications by arbitral institutions could have an
immediate impact upon a large number of 
existing cases.
1 58
Other types of transparency might improve the quality of a
tribunal's decision making and indirectly promote consistency.
Arbitration rules might give interested third parties an opportunity to
be heard or make submissions. Beyond giving those impacted by a
decision a voice in the process, there are significant benefits to
allowing amici to participate.
15 9 Submissions from non-parties can
make the arbitrators aware of issues or facts which they might not
otherwise be aware.
16° Non-party submissions might also suggest
alternative methods of legal analysis that the tribunal can consider and
accept or reject during the course of its deliberations. Likewise, amici
might present to the tribunal technical arguments or background that
the parties have not supplied.1
61
Although there are costs associated with amicus participation for
the parties, arbitrators, and amici themselves,
62 there are methods of
minimizing the burden. For example, given the costs of participation
157 OECD Statement, supra note 42, at 11.
158 This is the point of the OECD, which acknowledges that there "are a growing
number of arbitration awards which are likely to influence future cases and this has
argued for their systematic and quick publication." Id.
159 Joseph D. Kearny & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs
on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 745-48 (2002) (describing the benefits
and limitations of amici participation).
160 See Patricia Isela Hansen, Dispute Settlement in the NAFTA and Beyond, 40 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 417, 421 (2005) (explaining that amicus submissions can usefully expose
tribunals to a broader range of facts and opinions than disputing parties as well 
as
sensitizing tribunals to the broader social impact of their decisions).
161 See Methanex Award, supra note 109, at pt. IV(B), 27 (referring favorably to a
"carefully reasoned Amicus submission" from the International Institute for
Sustainable Development); see also Hansen, supra note 160, at 421 (explaining 
that
amici can help tribunals frame their decisions in ways that will minimize the risk of
widespread misunderstandings and confusion).
162 In particular, parties will typically need to review these submissions and need to
spend time, money, and other resources preparing appropriate responses. Likewise, 
the
tribunal will need to exert its resources to reviewing the amicus submissions and any
responses.
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to amici themselves, there are efficiencies in coordinating amici
submissions to maximize the possibility of effective assistance to the
tribunal. 63 Such cost and time saving coordination is likely to pass on
similar savings to parties - who may wish to reply to amici
submissions - and arbitrators - who will have to review and consider
the amici submissions and party replies. Likewise, amicus
participation might be restricted to those amici who are bringing a
relevant matter to the tribunal of which it is not already aware 64
Even without this restriction, however, the efficacy of third-party
participation might be usefully enhanced by offering public access to
pleadings so that the amici know the issues in dispute, understand the
arguments of the parties, and tailor their arguments to eliminate
duplication and add useful information.65 In recognition of the
benefits of third-party participation, ICSID recently proposed allowing
the participation of third parties in investment treaty arbitrations
under appropriate circumstances. 166 This suggestion serves as a useful
163 There have been over 300 interested parties in the Aguas Del Tunari v. Bolivia
case, but nevertheless, these amici made a single submission to the tribunal. See South
Centre I, supra note 166, at 11 (noting the 300 amici in the Bolivia case) with Center for
International Environmental Law, Three Hundred Citizen Groups Call on Secret World
Bank to Open Up Bechtel Case Against Bolivia (Aug. 29, 2002) http://www.ciel.org/
Tae/BechtelBoliviaAug02.html (discussing how the 300 amici are working together).
By working together, amici can share costs, increase the effectiveness of their advocacy,
and minimize the burden on the tribunal and the parties. See Kearny & Merrill, supra
note 159, at 752-54; IISD Comments, supra note 37, at 11 (suggesting that amici "will
always tend to act responsibly in the face of a responsible and responsive process, and
will seek among themselves to avoid undue duplication"); see also J. Harvie Wilkinson
III, The Question of Process, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1387, 1389 (2000) (observing that the
average number of amici briefs for a U.S. Supreme Court case is around four); Paul M.
Collins Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae
Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 807, 812 (2004)
(observing that even though there may be a significantly larger number of individual
amici there will be a limited number of briefs); Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme
Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. & POL. 33, 58 (2004)
(suggesting that the costs of preparing one U.S. Supreme Court amicus brief can be as
little as $50,000).
164 See, e.g., U.S. Supreme Court Rule 37(1),(2) (providing that an "amicus curiae
brief that brings to the attention of the Court a relevant manner not already brought to
its attention by the parties may be of considerable help to the Court" and setting out
that the parties can either agree to let the amicus participate or the Court can decide,
upon a motion by the amicus, to submit a brief); see also Kearney & Merrill, supra note
159 at 751-61(noting that in the 1950s and 1960s the Supreme Court tended to deny
petitions to file amicus briefs but in the last 40 years there has been an 800% increase in
the number of filings).
165 See also IISD Comments, supra note 37, at 11 (suggesting that also "one has to
know of an arbitration to be able to consider seeking amicus status").
166 See ICSID Working Paper, supra note 140, at 11 (permitting non-parties with a
"significant interest" in the proceeding to participate so long as they did "not disrupt
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model for other arbitration institutions that may wish to consider
amending their rules or offering a special protocol for investment
treaty arbitration.
Beyond proposed changes to institutional rules, legislative
reformers might also use treaty negotiations to provide a broader level
of transparency and to promote procedures, such as public
dissemination of awards, access to materials, and third-party
participation, that maximize consistency.
1 67  In contrast to other
countries, the United States and Canada have taken steps in their
treaties to improve transparency in their dispute resolution
mechanisms. 168 Specifically, the United States has included enhanced
transparency in various Free Trade Agreements,
169 including the
the proceeding, unduly burden, or unfairly prejudice either party; and that both parties
are given an opportunity of presenting their observations on the non-disputing party
submission"); but see South Centre, Developments on Discussions for the Improvement
of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration and the Participation of Developing Countries,
SC-TADP/AN/INV/1 9-11 (Feb. 2005), http://www.southcentre.org/tadp-Ywebpage/
research-papers/investment-project/icsid discpaper-feb05.doc [hereinafter South
Centre I (suggesting that the participation of third parties was inappropriate and
unduly burdensome); see also South Centre, Proposed Amendments of ICS1D Rules:
Process Related and Substantive Issues on ICSID Reform for Developing Countries,
SC/TADP/AN/INV/1 (Aug. 2005), http://www.southcentre.org/tadp webpage/
research-papers/investment-project/icsid-discpaper-aug05.doc [hereinafter South
Centre II].
167 Legislative reformers typically discuss making changes to substantive rights to
provide enhanced certainty. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
Nevertheless, this same "legislative" approach of negotiating individual treaties can be
used to build safeguards into the dispute resolution mechanism and to offer enhanced
transparency in individual BITs as a method of indirectly reducing the risk of
consistency.
168 The most recent version of the US Model BIT, for example, usefully provides
that the tribunal can accept and consider amicus curiae submissions from non-parties,
pleadings will be made public, and - subject to concerns related to sensitive business
information or nationality - the hearings will be public. See Revised US Model BIT,
supra note 25, at arts 28, 29. Canada, likewise, has provisions for transparency
including public access to hearings and documents, but they are more extensive than
those of the United States, and even set out the standards for when arbitrators may
accept submissions from non-parties. Canada's Model Foreign Investment Promotion
and Protection Agreement, arts. 38-39, 2004, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-
nac/documents/2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf.
169 Chapter 10 of the US/Chile FTA establishes a more transparent dispute
resolution process and offers protections such as giving a non-disputing party access to
documents, requiring that tribunals send copies of the final awards to non-parties, and
extending confidentiality in the case of sensitive business information and issues of
national security. See United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, arts. 10.19, 10.20,
June 6, 2003, http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Chile/text/index.html; see also Scott Jablonski,
iSi, Po! Foreign Investment Dispute Resolution Does Have a Place in Trade Agreements
in the Americas: A Comparative Look at Chapter 10 of the United States-Chile Free
Trade Agreement, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 627,630 (2003).
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recently enacted Central American Free Trade Agreement, in which
the United States incorporated provisions for public hearings and
third-party attendance at arbitrations. 170
Another indirect method of enhancing consistency is to promote a
dispute resolution system in which there is equality of arms among the
parties to ensure the full and fair resolution of the dispute. While
parties are unlikely to possess identical financial or personal resources,
the principle of "equality of arms obligates a judicial body to ensure
that neither party is put at a disadvantage when presenting its case.' 171
Recently, issues have arisen as to the equality of arms of parties
resolving investment treaty disputes; more specifically, there is concern
that developing countries, which may have unequal access to legal
authority and expertise, may be unable to participate fully in the
dispute resolution process.1 72  For example, countries such as the
Seychelles, which is defending an ICSID case 73 may have "an
unreliable internet connection, no access to Westlaw or Lexis-Nexis,
and no treatises on ICSID or investment arbitration" and instead
defend themselves with only their "wits, a copy of the ICSID
Convention and Rules, and two outdated English contract law
treatises. ' 174 Likewise, when Argentina first began defending its treaty
claims, Argentinean government lawyers did not have access to
fundamental substantive law or arbitration doctrine. Since hiring
outside counsel was not a viable option, government lawyers flew to
the United States a few days prior to the hearings to do the necessary
research and spent their own money to buy copies of key arbitration
treatises. 175 This lack of equality of arms between the parties can
170 CAFTA-DR, supra note 4. CAFTA-DR's article 20.11(1) states that upon
written notice to disputing parties, third parties shall be entitled to attend all hearings.
Article 2 0.10(1)(a) goes further to state that there will be at least one hearing before
the arbitration panel, and it shall be open to the public. Id. at art 20.11(1).
171 Kayishema and Ruzindana, (Appeals Chamber), June 1, 2001, IT 63-71;
Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1 (Appeals Chamber), July 15, 1999, 48.
172 See Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field: Is It Time for a Legal Assistance
Center for Developing Nations in ICSID Arbitration (2005) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
173 CDC Group plc v. Republic of the Seychelles, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/02/14 (Award) (Dec. 17, 2003), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
CDCvSeychellesAward 001.pdf; CDC Group plc v. Republic of the Seychelles, ICSID
(W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/14 (Annulment Decision) (June 29, 2005) available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CDCSeychellesAnnulmentDecision'pdf. This claim
was brought under the ICSID Convention but was not an investment treaty claim per
se.
174 Gottwald, supra note 172, at 8 (citing Interview with Anthony Fernando,
Attorney Gen. of the Sey. (Mar. 25, 2005)).
175 Gottwald, supra note 172, at 10. Argentina now has a more developed in-house
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create challenges for obtaining fully reasoned and considered awards,
which contributes to obtaining consistent and reliable results.
176
While ICSID has acknowledged the wish to train lawyers from
developing countries,'177 beyond the useful potential for capacity
building, it offers no suggestion for particularized legal advice or
assistance once a dispute arises. It may be appropriate to consider the
utility of offering a legal assistance center for developing nations
involved in investment treaty arbitrations.
78 This legal assistance
center might be similar to the Advisory Center for WTO Law, which
exists to advise developing nations in trade disputes at the World
Trade Organization (WTO). 179  By promoting the equality -of arms,
tribunals can deliberate with greater confidence that relevant
arguments have been raised and briefed, which better enables them to
make reasoned and appropriate decisions.
2. Direct Methods: Creating Institutions
Other, more direct methods could be used to rectify inconsistent
awards. In particular, Sovereigns might create international
institutions to ameliorate confusions caused by inconsistent awards or
correct inconsistencies as they arise. Such institutions might take the
form of a Free Trade Commission (FTC) or an appellate body.
FTCs such as the one established in the NAFTA, offer a built-in
control to provide tribunals with interpretive guidance to avoid the
temptation to go astray. FTCs are comprised of government ministers
from signatory countries who meet to discuss trade-related activities
and might also issue binding interpretations about the meaning of
investment rights, which then become part of the applicable law of the
legal team to defend it in investment treaty claims.
176 See Burke-White Community of Courts, supra note 136, at 67-70 (describing how
a lack of resources and inequality of arms can adversely affect the quality of the
decision making process).
177 See ICSID White Paper, supra note 36, at 14 (noting that ICSID has co-operated
in the past to provide training programs for officials from developing countries on the
arbitration of investment disputes); ICSID Working Paper, supra note 140, at 4
(suggesting that it will issue a separate paper in due course on the possibility of
collaborative efforts to engage in training activities).
178 Gottwald, supra note 172, at 23-31.
179 See International Institute for Sustainable Development, IlSD Model
International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development: Negotiators
Handbook,56 (2005) http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment-model int
handbook.pdf [hereinafter IISD Model International Agreement] (describing a legal
assistance center derived from "the WTO Legal Advisory Center, created to assist
developing countries in capacity building and by providing expert advice on trade law
cases" and suggesting that a center "assist developing countries in responding to
claims").
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treaty. 180 While there has been some concern about how NAFfA's
FTC has used its authority and whether an "interpretive" note might
impermissibly amend a treaty, 81 FTCs offer the promise of enhanced
consistency on a treaty-specific basis. They do not, however, offer
broader coherence.
A slightly different safeguard - namely, an investment arbitration
appellate body - could also be created. This appellate body has the
potential benefit of immediately correcting inconsistencies within the
network on a multilateral basis. "Getting it right" in a "bet the
country" dispute is vital. While a more challenging reform to
implement, 82 an appellate body would provide a critical opportunity to
review awards, correct errors and establish a reliable body of law.
ICSID's recent proposal for the creation of an Appeals Facility,
offered a useful starting point but was recently taken off the table and
described as "premature."'83  Interest in this suggestion remains,
however. 8
4
180 See NAFTA, supra note 4, at arts. 1131, 2001; Franck, Inconsistent Decisions,
supra note 1, at 1604; Alvarez & Park, supra note 93, at 400; Coe, supra note 17, at
1410.
181 Brower, Structure, supra note 12, at 78-79, 82; Weiler, Metalclad, supra note 98;
Todd Weiler, NAFTA Investment Arbitration and the Growth of International
Economic Law, 36 CAN. Bus. L.J. 405, 429 (2002) [hereinafter Weiler, NAFTAJ;
Paterson, supra note 125, at 110; but see Methanex Award, supra note 109, at pt. IV(C),
11-25.
182 This might most usefully be done by drafting a multi-lateral convention, which
would act as umbrella and permit Sovereigns to agree to subject individual BITs to the
protection of a larger appellate body. Such an approach is theoretically appropriate as
it recognizes the inter-related yet distinct nature of each BIT. Should countries fail to
sign up to such a multi-lateral Convention, there will doubtless be problems with
horizontal consistency in the sense that some BITs - but not others - had the benefit
of access to an appellate mechanism. Nevertheless, the added value and procedural
protections afforded by a single body should not be underestimated. See generally
Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1; see also Andrea K. Bjorklund, The
Continuing Appeal of Annulment?: Lessons from Amco Asia and CME, in Weiler,
Leading Cases, supra note 111, at 510-515.
183 ICSID Working Paper, supra note 140, at 4. ICSID's White Paper notes that its
proposal must necessarily relate to those Sovereigns that are signatories to the ICSID
Convention. ICSID does suggest, however, that its Appeals Facility may be organized
in such a way that it would be willing to accept appeals related to ICSID Additional
Facility cases, ad hoc UNCITRAL arbitrations, and arbitrations provided under other
dispute arbitration mechanism in an investment treaty. ICSID White Paper, supra note
36, at Annex at 1-2.
184 IISD, Model International Agreement, supra note 179, at 55-56; IISD,
Comments on ICSID, supra note 37, at 4-6 & 12-13. South Centre II, supra note 166, at
5-6; see also supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text (noting that arbitration rejecters
also appreciate the utility of some sort of transnational judicial body to rectify
inconsistency).
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The U.S. Trade Promotion Authority Act suggests that, when
negotiating future investment treaties, the U.S. will consider an
appellate body for each treaty. The United States currently has
obligations to negotiate about establishing appellate bodies with a
variety of countries that have signed Free Trade Agreements with the
United States.185 This approach is likely to lead to the creation of
bilateral, disaggregated appellate bodies. The existence of these
various appellate bodies could exacerbate the current challenges of
inconsistency by creating multiple bodies of appellate law, potentially
resulting in different findings and results on the same issue.186 In
contrast to the approach currently suggested by U.S. legislation and
treaty obligations, a single, permanent body charged with interpreting
the network of investment treaties would more readily promote the
creation of a reliable, predictable and clear jurisprudence.
187
3. Hybrid Methods
A group of hybrid mechanisms also could be used to minimize
problems of inconsistency. These hybrid approaches provide both
indirect and direct procedural opportunities to minimize the degree of
inconsistency, but they cannot rectify inconsistency fully.
Consolidation or concurrent hearings are useful procedural tools
to minimize inconsistency. Consolidating claims that have common
issues of fact or law provides an opportunity to promote consistent
factual findings or legal conclusions. If a single tribunal decides a
series of claims, this eliminates the possibility of different tribunals will
reach different conclusions based on the same treaty or the same
185 CAFTA-DR, supra note 4, at Annex 10-F (stating that "the Commission [FTC]
shall establish a Negotiating Group to develop an appellate body or similar mechanism
to review awards rendered by tribunals under this Chapter"); United States-Chile Free
Trade Agreement, Annex 10-H, June 6, 2003, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade
_Agreements/Bilateral/SingaporeF[A/FinalTexts/asset-upload-file708_4036.pdf;
United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, May 6, 2003,
http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Singapore/final/2004-01-
15-final.pdf; see also Revised US
Model BIT, supra note 25; see also Revised US Model BIT, supra note 25, at 39
(providing that "[w]ithin three years after the date of entry into force of the Treaty, the
Parties shall consider whether to establish a bilateral appellate body or similar
mechanism to review awards").
186 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3)(G)(iv)(4) (2004) suggests that when negotiating future
BITs and Free Trade Agreements there should be a provision - in each individual
treaty - that would require an "an appellate body or similar mechanism to provide
coherence to the interpretation of investment provisions in trade agreements". The
Trade Promotion Authority Act does not speak of a multi-lateral appellate mechanism
to create coherence across the network.
187 The structure of such an appellate body has been discussed in greater detail at
Franck, Inconsistent Decisions, supra note 1.
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conduct. Claims consolidation might, for example, usefully reduce the
risk of inconsistency where a single government measure spawns a
variety of claims.
As consolidation of claims is only occurs where both parties have
agreed to consolidate, there are challenges with this approach. It
might therefore be useful to articulate the right to consolidate in an
investment treaty or in the relevant procedural rules.188 This secures
party consent in advance and will typically grant a tribunal authority to
consolidate. This requirement of party agreement also means
consolidation offers an incomplete solution.189 If not all claims are
being brought under an agreement permitting consolidation, party
agreement to consolidate the claims must be sought after the fact;190
and as a practical matter, this approval will be difficult to obtain. This
means, for example, if U.S. investors bring a claim against Argentina
under the U.S./Argentina BIT and German investors bring claims
under the Germany/Argentina BIT and neither BITs have
consolidation provisions, the U.S. and German investors will have no
obligation to consolidate - even if this is precisely what the
Argentinean government desires.191 While consolidation may be a
useful procedural mechanism, absent an applicable multinational
consolidation convention, it has limitations.192
188 NAFTA, supra note 4, at art. 1126; Canfor v. United States, (Decision on
Consolidation) (May 20, 2005) http://www.economia-snci.gob.mx/sphp-pages/
importa/sol contro/consultoria/CasosMexico/Consolidacion/acuerdos/050520Orden_
deTribunal de Acumulacion.pdf.
189 Likewise, joinder is unlikely to minimize the possibility on inconsistent decisions.
Joinder typically involves bringing an essential third party before a tribunal. The
LCIA, for example, permits a consenting third party to be made a party to the
proceedings at the request of one party. LCIA Arbitration Rules, art. 22.1(h),
http://www.lcia-arbitration.com/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2005). Unlike a commercial claim
where one party says a third party is responsible for the claimant's harm, joinder is of
less utility. A Sovereign is ultimately responsible for how it has complied with its
obligations; there generally is no third party with whom to apportion blame.
190 The Revised US Model BIT, for example, expressly permits the consolidation of
claims. See Revised US Model BIT, supra note 25, at art. 33. But, other treaties do not
include such provisions. Treaty between the United States of America and the
Republic of Ecuador concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, Aug. 27, 1993, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/
ecuadorusa-sp.pdf (not including a right to consolidate); Ireland/Czech Republic BIT
supra note 15 (same).
191 This is not, however, the exclusive province of governments. For example, in the
Lauder cases, the investors tried to consolidate the claim by having the same tribunal
decide both cases; but the government rejected this offer. See Brower et al., Global
Adjudication, supra note 47.
192 At the American Society of International Law's Annual Meeting in April 2005,
Bart Legum, former head of the U.S. Department of State's NAFTA Claims Division
raised the possibility of an international consolidation convention related to treaty
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Along a similar vein, treaties or institutional rules might expressly
provide an opportunity for concurrent hearings of related cases. While
different tribunals will still make individual decisions, having
contemporaneously heard a common set of facts and arguments may
increase the probability that similar cases will be decided in a similar
manner.193 Unless all parties in the related hearings have agreed to
concurrent proceedings, 194 this procedural mechanism will have limited
utility.
195
Another hybrid mechanism provides tribunals with the authority
to develop a consistent jurisprudence; but its prospective nature and
inability to correct inconsistent decisions reflects its hybrid character.
That mechanism includes the production of a cohesive academic
literature on investment treaty arbitrations. In particular, a developed
academic literature, carrying precedential value under the ICJ
Statute, 196 could re-introduce certainty by establishing norms of
claims. Carolyn Lamm, Moderator, Parallel Proceedings in International Litigation and
Arbitration (April 1, 2005).
193 Other practical tactics inherent in the arbitration process could also be used to
minimize the possibility of inconsistent results. For example, tribunals selecting the
third arbitrator might choose a common chair for related cases. Likewise, parties could
simply elect to appoint the same arbitrator in related cases or agree that they will be
bound by the determinations of a first tribunal. While this could reduce or eliminate
the possibility of inconsistent decisions, it would be challenging to enshrine in
institutional rules or a treaty. Such choices occur tactically and on a case-by-case basis.
194 Parties could agree by way of the dispute resolution procedures articulated in the
BIT, by agreeing to institutional rules that permit concurrent hearings, or by making an
agreement after the disputes have arisen to engage in concurrent hearings.
195 There are other procedural mechanisms that might be used to address
consistency, but unfortunately these are not tenable in the context of investment treaty
arbitration. Use of doctrines such as res judicata or lis alibi pendens are unlikely to
minimize problems of inconsistency, as different claims typically involve different
parties in interest and different causes of action. This was acknowledged in the Lauder
cases given the distinctions between the claimant and the nature of the rights and
obligations. Lauder Award, supra note 50, at 169-72; see also Kuihn, supra note 60, at
11-15 (describing the challenges to using doctrines such as lis pendens and res judicata
in the context of investment treaty arbitration); Bjorklund, Weiler, Leading Cases,
supra note 111, at 516-21.
196 See ICJ Statute, supra note 38, at art. 38, (describing the order of binding
authority before the ICJ as "a. international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom,
as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations; d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law"); see also Gabrielle
Kaufman-Kohler, Annulment of ICSID Awards in Contracts and Treaty Arbitrations:
Are There Differences, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION INSTITUTE, ANNULMENT OF
ICSID AWARDS 189, 220 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi, eds., 2004)
(describing the lack of stare decisis at ICSID).
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interpretation among treaties. Given the speed with which investors
are filing cases and arbitrators are making awards, the law has moved
ahead of the academic literature; scholars can play a vital role in
bridging this gap and offering guidance about how to "square the
circle" and harmonize public international law. Better yet,
implementing this suggestion simply requires scholars to pick up a pen.
While there may be differences in opinion and approach among
academic commentators, this healthy debate is not problematic and
ultimately should prove useful. Thorough probing of public
international law issues will tease out critical distinctions, clarify areas
of divergence and commonality, and, ultimately, provide tribunals with
a considered discourse upon which they can reflect when struggling
with the application of an emerging area of law - namely the law
governing the meaning of those substantive rights under investment
treaties - to varied and complex facts. 197  This discourse should
provide tribunals with authority they can utilize to develop a clear,
consistent, and reliable jurisprudence. This consistency can, in turn,
provide the public, investors, and Sovereigns with increased certainty
and predictability about their rights and obligations.
IV. CONCLUSION
Let us return to De Toqueville to bring these remarks full circle.
In Democracy in America he wrote that the "great privilege of the
Americans does not simply consist in their being more enlightened
than other nations, but in their being able to repair the faults they may
commit." 198  The United States need not have a monopoly on the
capacity to recognize problems and rectify faults. Rather, it is the
responsibility of Sovereigns to evaluate the consequences of ceding
substantive rights in investment treaties and consider their implications
for the future. 199 Users of investment treaty arbitration also must
ensure that the dispute resolution process meets their needs by
providing reliable results so that they can manage their investment
197 Justice Scalia has also commented that criticism from the academy is an effective
check on inappropriate decision making. Scalia, supra note 76, at 1180. The challenge
in the context of investment treaty arbitration is that the scholarship is in a more
embryonic stage than the case law. See supra note 111.
198 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 13, at 266.
199 Even controversial awards can have a positive impact upon the development of
investment arbitration jurisprudence. Such awards provide information about the
scope of rights that Sovereigns may be granting investors, which, in turn, provides
Sovereigns with an opportunity to make more informed decisions about which rights -
and the scope of such rights - they offer and manage their expectations about the
process and substance more effectively. Franck, International Decision, supra note 18,
at 680-81.
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risks.200
By recognizing the unique problems caused by inconsistency in the
context of investment arbitration, we can begin moving forward to
consider how best to resolve these challenges. While the suggestions
of barrier builders and arbitration rejecters merit consideration,
ultimately they neither address nor minimize the challenges related to
inconsistency and, in fact, may exacerbate some of the difficulties. In
contrast, by utilizing the approaches of safeguard builders and, to some
extent, legislative reformers, investment treaty arbitration can utilize
indirect, direct and hybrid measures to bring greater clarity and
consistency to the meaning investment treaty rights. In this manner,
predictability, reliability, clarity, efficiency and consistency can
revitalize the network of investment treaty disputes and address the
concerns of citizens, investors and Sovereigns alike.
200 This might include retaining political risk insurance so as to protect their
investment against adverse changes such as expropriation, discrimination, foreign
exchange controls, or civil disturbances. There are a variety of institutions that offer
such protection, including OPIC, MIGA and ECGD. See Franck, Inconsistent
Decisions, supra note 1, at 1620-21 n.469.
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